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This dissertation is divided into two phases. The main objective of this phase is to use Bayesian 
MCMC technique, to attain (1) estimates, (2) predictions and (3) posterior probability of sales 
greater than certain amount for sampled regions and any random region selected from the 
population or sample. These regions are served by a single product manufacturer who is 
considered to be similar to newsvendor. The optimal estimates, predictions and posterior 
probabilities are obtained in presence of advertising expenditure set by the manufacturer, past 
historical sales data that contains both censored and exact observations and finally stochastic 
regional effects that cannot be quantified but are believed to strongly influence future demand. 
Knowledge of these optimal values is useful in eliminating stock-out and excess inventory 
holding situations while increasing the profitability across the entire supply chain.  
Subsequently, the second phase, examines the impact of Cournot and Stackelberg games in a 
supply-chain on shelf space allocation and pricing decisions. In particular, we consider two 
scenarios: (1) two manufacturers competing for shelf space allocation at a single retailer, and (2) 
two manufacturers competing for shelf space allocation at two competing retailers, whose pricing 
decisions influence their demand which in turn influences their shelf-space allocation. We obtain 
the optimal pricing and shelf-space allocation in these two scenarios by optimizing the profit 
functions for each of the players in the game. Our numerical results indicate that (1) Cournot 
games to be the most profitable along the whole supply chain whereas Stackelberg games and 
mixed games turn out to be least profitable, and (2) higher the shelf space elasticity, lower the 
wholesale price of the product; conversely, lower the retail price of the product, greater the shelf 





Accurate prediction of demand is crucial to an integrated supply chain. Knowing how much to 
supply in order to reduce stock-outs and surplus inventory is critical for achieving optimum 
profits. However, accurate prediction/estimation of optimal demand of a product is complicated 
due to the presence of censored demand data, which depends crucially on various factors such as 
the advertising budget, price of the product and its substitute, product’s shelf space allocation, 
and competition among the product manufacturers and the retailers. In addition, optimal demand 
estimation is complicated by the stochastic nature of random store/regional effects, which include 
such factors as geographical location, population density, and weather that have significant 
impact on sales but are difficult to quantify for modeling purposes. Despite an extensive research 
on accurate modeling of supply chains over the last two decades with special emphasis on 
demand and inventory estimation models, there still remain many practical/implementation issues 
related to these models that have not received due attention. 
 
This dissertation presents a macro-micro estimation of demand faced by a manufacturer-retailer 
duo. The macroscopic phase is defined as demand estimation at regional level for a single product 
manufacturer and the microscopic phase is defined as demand estimation at store level for a 
retailer selling competing substitutable products. For a given product, the manufacturer is 
interested in a macroscopic estimation of regional demand in the presence of stochasticity 
introduced by random regional effects such as geographical location and population density and 
the advertising budget, which is considered to have the most dominant effect on demand for a 
product. To address this macroscopic phase of regional demand estimation, in this dissertation, a 
Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) technique is used to predict and estimate optimal 
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regional demand for a product in the presence of censored and exact demand data subjected to 
certain random regional effects and a fixed advertising budget.  
 
From a microscopic demand estimation point of view, the stochasticity in macroscopic demand 
arises due to random amounts of demand at the store/retailer level. These random demand levels 
at the store/retailer are influenced by competition among local retailers, competition among 
substitutable products, shelf space allocated for a particular product and the pricing strategies 
adopted by the retailers. Consequently, at the microscopic (store/retailer) level of demand 
estimation, this study considers the following two scenarios: (1) a single retailer, two 
manufacturer scenario to understand the influence of competing substitutable products on local 
demand estimation; and (2) two competing retailers and two competing manufacturers scenario to 
understand the influence of competition among retailers through their pricing and shelf space 
allocation strategies. Cournot and Stackelberg game theory models are used to study competition 
among retailers and manufacturers to obtain optimal pricing and shelf space allocation strategies 
at Nash equilibrium. The optimal (local) demand at each of the retailers is derived based on these 
optimal pricing and shelf space allocation strategies. Finally, these optimal local demands at each 
of the retailers are then summed up to obtain the stochastic regional demand at the macroscopic 
level. Repeating this procedure with a different value of microscopic stochastic parameter each 
time, a macroscopic demand distribution for the stochastic effects on regional demand is 
obtained.  
 
This dissertation presents a unique hierarchical demand estimation methodology that takes into 
account censored/missing historical data, competition and cooperation among the supply chain 
members, pricing and shelf space allocation strategies, and stochastic (random) regional effects. 
Demand estimation models that account for censored data, competition among supply chain 
 ix
partners, and random regional effects are especially important for perishable goods and those with 
short life spans in order to eliminate variability or “bullwhip effect”, reduce stock-outs and carry 
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A supply chain is, broadly speaking, “the network of retailers, distributors, transporters, storage 
facilities and suppliers that participate in the sale, delivery and production of a particular product” 
[1]. From the definition above, it is clear that supply-chain management is a cross-functional 
approach to management of the movement of raw materials into an organization, certain aspects 
of the internal processing of materials into finished goods, and the subsequent movement of 
finished goods out of the organization towards the end consumer. The related term "supply-chain 
execution" refers to the process of managing and coordinating the movement of materials, 
information, and funds across the supply chain. Common problems encountered in executing a 
typical supply chain often occur in the following areas: 
 
 Demand estimation and/or inventory management. The main issue here is the accurate 
estimation of demand quantity and the location of inventory (including raw materials, 
work in process and finished goods) in order to avoid either excess inventory holding or 
stock-out situations.  
 
 Information sharing and cash flow: The integration of systems and processes throughout 
the supply chain is critical to enable the sharing of valuable information, including 
demand signals, forecasts, inventory and transportation etc. Arranging for payment terms 
and methods for exchanging funds across the entities within the supply chain is an 
important issue.  
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 Distribution network configuration and strategies. The effective design of the 
distribution network including the number and location of suppliers, production facilities, 
distribution centers, warehouses, and customers, is critical to smooth production along 
with perfect strategies. Significant decisions that must be made include whether to adopt 
a centralized or decentralized models, as well as whether to use direct shipment, cross 
docking, push/pull strategies. 3PL also needs to be addressed.  
 
The key issues at all levels of activity—strategic, tactical and operation—are the accurate 
estimation and forecasting of demand. Accurate prediction of the demand for a product plays a 
crucial role in governing strategies for amplified cash flow, superior distribution strategies and 
network configuration, improved information sharing and enhanced profits for all the supply 
chain partners. Strategic questions about demand continually perplex both retailers and 
manufacturers: Do current conditions show signs of too much market supply? Too little demand? 
Vice versa? How much supply or demand is “too much”? When is the right balance achieved? All 
these questions are dependent on demand estimation in one way or another.  
In general, there are two ways to view market share: by supply or by demand (that is, from either 
the manufacturer's or the retailer's perspective). Analysis of consumer spending reveals market 
demand, or retail potential. Examining business revenues, advertising budgets, sales (censored) or 
demand data (exact), and competition reveals market supply. However, the accurate estimation of 
demand and its forecasting in an integrated supply chain is a complicated problem for various 
reasons: 
 Presence of too many influential factors that directly or indirectly sway the demand 
curve[2]; 
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 Methods used to analyze the data are not appropriate for the purpose, resulting in 
incorrect results and interpretations [3] ; 
 Missing data for a certain time period or periods; 
 Competition among supply-chain partners and different supply chains.  
 Availability of multiple substitutable items in the same product category.  
Various researchers have attacked the problem of accurate forecasting. Meredith (2006) [2] has 
presented a list of variables that make demand estimation complicated at various levels of the 
supply chain and cause the most serious estimation errors. Robert (1985) [3] in his article 
reviewed 29 different research methodologies used for measuring the demand for a 
telecommunication product. There were several mistakes in how the studies had been designed 
and implemented, and he suggested methods for improving the accuracy of the forecasts.  
Radchenko and Tsurumi (2006) [4] estimate parameters and a supply demand equations of the US 
gasoline market using Bayesian MCMC techniques because of the limited nature of the available 
information. Harish et al. (2008) [5] present a replenishment model for retail stores incorporating 
direct and cross space elasticities while considering demand rate to be linearly dependent on the 
shelf space allocated to a product by a multiple product retailer, using mathematical optimization 
techniques. Herr’ an et al. (2006)[6] consider two competing manufacturers fighting for shelf 
space at a single retailer and use game theory to resolve this dilemma. All the above mentioned 
models consider some variables and try to estimate demand using different methods for different 
sections of the supply chain partners. But none of them consider integration or looking at the 




Over the last three decades, numerous demand estimation models have been proposed in order to 
gain a better understanding of inventory management and demand estimation in a supply chain. 
Until recently, however, many of these studies have concentrated on estimating demand at an 
isolate level(whether retailer or manufacturer) of a supply chain. That is these studies consider 
demand estimation at individual levels of a supply chain and did not consider interactions among 
retailers and manufacturers through their pricing and strategic decisions. In a pioneering work, 
Edward Hawkins (1957) [7] presented on of the earliest demand estimation models to identify 
demand at an isolated level of a supply chain. In this article Hawkins pointed out that statistical 
analysis of the demand data yielded reliable results in estimating the price elasticity of demand. 
Even today, most retailers, even large ones such as Wal-Mart, use simple forecasting techniques 
based on regression analysis and exponential smoothing methods to analyze, interpret and 
forecast demand. However, these simple regression and exponential smoothing methods suffer 
from shortcomings that arise from the presence of censored and missing data in the historical data 
sets on which demand forecasting depends [8]  
 
Choi et al. (2003) [9] investigated an optimal two-stage ordering policy for seasonal products. 
Market information is collected at the first stage and is used to update the demand forecast at the 
second stage by using a Bayesian approach. A two-stage dynamic optimization problem is 
formulated, and an optimal policy is derived using dynamic programming. The service level and 
profit uncertainty level under the optimal policy are discussed. Extensive numerical analyses are 
carried out to study the performance of the optimal policy. Yang et al. (2003) [10] developed a 
Bayesian method to address the computational challenge of estimating simultaneous demand and 
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supply models that can be applied to both the analysis of household panel data and aggregated 
demand data. These models use Bayesian methods to evaluate demand from a supplier's 
perspective and do not investigate the hidden potential of these Bayesian methods. 
 
Urban (1998) [11]suggested a heuristic that allocates shelf space by removing at each iteration the 
item in the assortment with the lowest contribution to profits. The procedure stops when profits 
start to decrease. Building on Corstjens and Doyle (1981)[12], Borin et al. (1994) [13] used an 
elaborated version of the same demand function to allow for simultaneous decisions about 
assortment selection and shelf space allocation. Yang and Chen (1999) [14] used a simplified 
version of the same demand formulation by not including the cross-elasticities and assumed that a 
product's profit is linear within a small number of facings which are constructed by the products 
lower and upper bound of the number of facings. The term facing is defined as “the number of 
identical products (or same SKUs) on a shelf turned out toward the customer”[15]. If used as verb 
it can also be defined as : “the act of pulling each product to the front edge of a shelf with the 
label turned forward. This gives the store an appearance of being full with merchandise”[15]. 
This is commonly used terminology while implementing certain shelf space allocation strategies 
using common software’s while cleaning up the store and making it user friendly for the 
customers. 
On the other hand, Chintagunta and Jain (1992) [16] adopted a differential game strategy to 
examine the effect of channel dynamics on the difference in profits resulting from following 
coordinated rather than uncoordinated strategies; they also identify situations in which this profit 
differential provides an incentive for channel members to coordinate their marketing efforts. 
Subsequently, Jorgensen and Zaccour (1999) [17] proposed a differential game model for 
analyzing the relationship between two firms under conditions of conflict and of coordination; 
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they also include pricing and advertising strategies for both the firms under consideration. The 
models described in this paragraph all try to evaluate demand from retailers' perspectives while 
introducing competition. But none of these models actually account for manufacturers' decisions 
on shelf-space allocation, which affects the demand experienced by the retailer. 
 
Despite an extensive amount of research on demand estimation models, there still remain 
practical and implementation issues that have not been addressed. Some of those issues are 
outlined below:  
 
 how to deal with the presence of censored demand (historical) data;  
 the role of marketing/advertising expenditures; 
 competition among the supply chain partners in terms of pricing, substitutable 
products, and shelf-space allocation strategies;  
 stochastic/random regional effect (geographical location, population density, 
weather, household income, etc.). 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
 
The main aim of this research is to develop a hierarchical demand estimation methodology that 
takes into account censored and exact historical data, the influence of marketing/advertising 
expenditure on demand, competition and cooperation among the supply chain members, the 
pricing decisions of the partners, shelf-space allocation strategies, and stochastic (random) 
regional effects.  
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The definition of "supply chain" in Section 1.1 clearly states that all supply chains consist of 
different tiers, each tier representing a supply-chain partner or member. As a result, the factors 
that influence the demand at each tier are also different. Therefore, demand models at different 
tiers of a supply chain are different because of disparate influencing factors. Consequently, this 
dissertation investigates a macro-micro level [2] estimation of the demand faced by 
manufacturers and retailers of a supply chain in order to obtain optimal demand, pricing, and 
shelf-space allocation values at different tiers of the supply chain.  
 
The macro-level model (Phase I) of this dissertation deals with demand estimation at the 
manufacturing level of a supply chain. This model estimates regional demand for a single product 
at a manufacturer in the presence of censored and exact sales  data, while taking into 
consideration the influence of factors such as advertising expenditure and stochastic regional 
effects on the demand for that product. On the other hand, the micro-level model deals with 
demand estimation at a retailer level of a supply chain. This model estimates demand at a retailer 
level considering the effect of shelf-space allocation, pricing decisions, and the competition from 
substitutable products.  
 
The micro-level model (Phase II) of this dissertation is further divided into two scenarios that are 
defined below: 
 
 Scenario 1: This scenario is an extension of an already built demand estimation model by 
Herr’an et al. (2006) [6], consisting of two competing manufacturers of homogenous 
substitutable products battling for shelf space at a single retailer by means of their pricing 
decisions. The manufacturers' competition for shelf space influences the demand for each 
of the products.    
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 Scenario 2: This scenario extends the demand model formulation of Scenario 1 to 
consider two competing retailers as well as the two competing manufacturers. As in 
Scenario 1, the manufacturers compete with one another through their substitutable 
products, thereby influencing the shelf-space allocation at each of the retailers. The shelf-
space allocation in turn influences the demand for each of the products. In addition, the 
retailers compete with one another through their pricing strategies for each of the 
substitutable products.  
 
Demand estimation at the manufacturer level (macro-level model) is achieved using the Bayesian 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method. The Bayesian MCMC method is suitable for 
estimating demand in the presence of censored demand data. In addition, game theory-based 
models are used to incorporate the factor of competition among supply-chain partners 




Chapter 2 presents the macroscopic approach to demand estimation at the manufacturer level in 
an integrated supply chain. In this chapter we discuss in detail the Bayesian MCMC methodology 
used to solve the demand estimation problem for a single product manufacturer supplying the 
product to several regions. In particular, the Bayesian MCMC method accounts for : 
 
 historical sales data (which may contain both censored and exact observations),  
 the influence of advertising expenditure on demand, and  
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 stochastic regional effects that mimic such features as the effect of geographical location, 
population density, and weather on regional demand for a product.  
 
The specific aims of this macroscopic level regional demand estimation model are the following:  
 
 To estimate the posterior percentile of 90th percentile of demand for the sampled 
regions and a random region selected from the population or sample. 
 To predict the posterior percentile of 90th percentile of demand for the sampled 
regions and a random region selected from the population or sample. 
 To compute posterior probability of demand greater than a certain amount given 
random advertising budgets for the sample regions and for a random region selected 
from the population or sample.   
 
These 90th posterior percentiles are termed "optimal point predictions" and "estimates of 
demand." for the future demand observations and future parameter estimates for unknown 
parameters respectively. The novelty of this macro level model is that it provides demand 
forecasts in the presence of censored demand, as well as using Bayesian MCMC techniques. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the microscopic approach to demand estimation at the store/retailer level in an 
integrated supply chain. In particular, this phase focuses on demand estimation at the 
retailer/store level in the presence of competition and cooperation among the supply-chain 
partners (manufacturer-retailers) through optimal competitive pricing and shelf-space allocation 
strategies attained at Nash equilibrium using game theory methodology.  
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Specifically, this microscopic level is further split into two manageable scenarios for store-level 
demand estimation. The first scenario considers two manufacturers competing for shelf space at a 
single retailer, and the second scenario consists of two competing manufacturers battling for shelf 
space and pricing decisions at two competing retailers. In each of these scenarios, all the 
members (retailers as well as the manufacturers) of the supply chain use different game strategies 
in order to obtain optimal pricing and shelf space allocation strategies. The specific goals of this 
microscopic level local demand estimation model are as follows: 
 
 To formulate demand models for both scenarios and to optimize the profits for all the 
supply-chain members in both scenarios in order to derive optimal pricing and shelf-
space allocation strategies. 
 To introduce competition among the retailers in Scenario 2.This is the first time that the 
competitors' pricing for the same product is considered in the context of shelf-space 
allocation.  
 To demonstrate the real potential of this methodology and investigate the profits across 
the supply chain for both static and sequential games.  
 
This microscopic-level approach utilizes the tools of game theory models and optimization 
techniques in order to attain these goals. The novelty of this phase lies in the second scenario, 
where competition among the retailers is accounted for by inserting their competitor’s price for 
the same product into their respective demand models.  
 
Chapter 4 discusses the findings, provides general conclusions, and reflects on the limitations  of 
this research and future directions for research beyond this dissertation. Pictorial representation of 
the organization is presented in Figure 1 for  better understanding.  
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The main objective of this study is to use the Bayesian MCMC technique to obtain several 
important pieces of information: (1) estimates; (2) predictions; and (3) posterior probabilities of 
sales for optimal percentiles of demand for a certain product supplied to different regions across 
North America. The manufacturer serving these regions is similar to an individual newsvendor. 
The optimal estimates, predictions and probabilities are obtained in the presence of  an 
advertising budget set by the manufacturer for that product, from historical censored and exact 
sales data, and from random region effects that cannot be quantified but that significantly impact 
the future demand for the product. Knowing these optimal estimates and predictions helps the 
manufacturer reduce stock-outs and the retention of excessive stock; this translates to increased 
profitability across the entire supply chain.  
.  
Keywords:  supply chain, demand, censored demand, inventory, prediction intervals, credibility 





Executing a supply-chain complicated because of the uncertainties associated with each cross 
functional component involved. The measurement of uncertainty is a complicated task due to the 
presence of many influential factors,[2] such as censored and exact demand data, advertising, 
pricing decisions, shelf space allocation, competition among supply chain partners and any 
random effects (weather, geographical location, etc) that are believed to significantly impact 
future demand but cannot be quantified.  A plethora of research has been conducted in this area of 
demand estimation using various statistical, mathematical and analytical models. These models 
provide interesting insights and valuable tools for obtaining future demand by estimating 
inventory or predicting demand. In general, there are two ways to measure market share: through 
(1) inventory models and (2) demand distribution models.  
 
Researchers such as Karlin (1960)[18], Scarf (1960)[19]  and Iglehart (1964)[20] have studied 
updating schemes for dynamic inventory policies with exponential family of demand density 
distributions having unknown parameters. These studies considered order up to policy as the 
optimal policy in which critical values depend on path of historical data (distributions followed) 
through sufficient statistic. Azoury (1985)[21]  extended the work of Karlin [18] and Iglehart [20] 
to more general demand distributions and provided conditions under which finding the optimal 
policy using Bayesian updating reduces to solving a stochastic dynamic programming problem in 
one dimension.  
 
Whereas Conrad (1976)[22]  was the first to explicitly distinguish between sales and demand in 
demand censored inventory systems and used a Poisson demand distribution to investigate the 
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effect of censored demand and proposed a Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE) of the Poisson 
parameter.  Subsequently, Nahmias (1994)[23]  considered a censored demand model with 
normal demand distribution and proposed a procedure for sequentially updating estimates of 
normal parameters. This study also addressed the difficulties associated with classical statistical 
approaches in parameter estimation. Agarwal and Smith (1996)[24] showed that a negative 
binomial distribution provides a better fit for discrete data than a Poisson or normal distribution 
and proposed a parameter estimation method. But in the presence of unknown demand 
distributions and historical data, a Bayesian updating approach provides better and more reliable 
demand estimates.  
 
Bayesian statistics is a significant tool that has been used previously to estimate demand. Despite 
their computational complexity, Bayesian methods have been in common use for more than five 
decades. Scarf (1959) [25] pioneered the empirical Bayesian approach to the problem, in which 
the retailer optimally manages his or her inventory levels by observing demand distribution over 
time. Assuming a normal distribution for both stated variables and unknown parameters, 
Florentine (1962) [26] observed that optimal control determined by Bayesian updating methods is 
better than that determined by non-Bayesian methods. Following a conjugate family concept, 
Branden and Friemer (1991)[27]  developed the so-called “newsboy distributions” (Weibull) that 
allow for a parsimonious updating process of the prior distribution for the case of unobserved lost 
sales with identically independently distributed (iid) demand realizations with a known shape and 
unknown scale parameters. Using Branden and Friemer's framework [27], Lariviere and Porteus 
(1999) [28] examined an empirical Bayesian inventory problem in which unmet demand is lost 
and unobserved. Using base stock inventory systems with truncated sales, Ding (2001) [29] 
developed Bayesian and maximum likelihood estimates for a Poisson and zero-inflated Poisson 
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demand distributions for a newsvendor and (s, S) inventory system with censored and exact 
demand data.   
 
This chapter presents the Bayesian MCMC technique as a tool to estimate and predict demand for 
the optimal demand percentile given censored and exact information, advertising expenditure set 
by the manufacturer of the product as well as random regional effects for all the sampled regions 
and any random region picked from the population.  The manufacturer sells his product to 
different regions all across North America. He is considered to be an individual newsvendor. 
 
The hypothetical scenario is as follows: A manufacturer that sells a certain product to different 
regions across North America and initiates to conduct an experiment in order to estimate and 
predict demand at some sampled regions in the presence of certain advertising expenditure set by 
the manufacturer and a stochastic regional -effects component (weather, geographical location, 
population density, income level of the families, etc., in that region) along with historical 
censored and exact demand data for that product. A Bayesian MCMC technique is utilized to 
meet this goal of estimating and predicting future demand for that product. This experiment is 
conducted to evaluate the efficacy of Bayesian MCMC techniques as well as to set the optimal 
advertising budget per region so as to optimize his cost structure, while trying to eliminate a bull-
whip effect across the supply chain partners. The manufacturer advertises for this product twice at 
the sample regions, and he maintains a centralized database that contains the historical sales data 
for that product. All the partners in the supply chain have to make decisions on the amount of 
inventory to carry in a given time period t. Limited inventory causes lost sales that are neither 
observed nor accounted for [30, 28]. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to estimate and 
predict demand in the presence of a limited inventory for a given advertising expenditure and 
stochastic regional effects.  
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Models for allocating advertising expenditure to market territories under sales uncertainty were 
developed using an exponential distribution where parameter values needed for the 
implementation of the model can be derived from the seemingly unrelated regression model [31]. 
Advertising expenditure is considered a key variable since empirical studies in the past have 
shown that advertising significantly influences demand for a product[32].  Sampled regions are 
selected randomly from a large population of regions across North America to which the 
manufacturer sells his product. Each sampled region is allocated an advertising expenditure per 
period for ‘t’ periods.  The time periods ‘t” for allocating the expenditure are chosen such that 
promotional periods or holiday periods are not included . Inclusion of promotional variables 
further complicates the analysis of the current problem, as we then need to include bumpy 
demand data along with censored and exact data. The sales data are represented as censored 
demand when sales are equal to inventory as well as exact demand when the sales are less than 
on-hand inventory.  
 
Though, previously cited studies involving censored data are based on either normally distributed 
demands (a common assumption in inventory modeling) or negative binomial demands, which 
has been observed in many real world environments, but for the censored data in this chapter we 
consider Weibull distribution. The Weibull Distribution belongs to the family of "newsboy 
distributions" characterized by Braden and Freimer (1991)[27]. It has a fixed dimensional 
sufficient statistic under exact and right-censored observations. In this chapter, the manufacturer 
is considered to be a “newsvendor” or “newsboy." Using the framework of Braden and Freimer 
(1991)[27], the historical demand dataset obtained at these manufacturers is considered to contain 
both exact and right-censored observations that follow a Weibull distribution with two unknown 
parameters . It is a significantly more difficult case than Braden and Freimer (1991)[27], because 
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it requires a two-dimensional joint prior distribution of the Weibull parameters known as shape 
and scale parameters. In this chapter, a diffused prior belief exists on the shape parameter β of the 
Weibull demand distribution, and the scale parameter follows a log linear relationship with 
advertising expenditure and stochastic regional effects. Furthermore, these two parameters are not 
constrained by the conjugate family concept. Using this demand distribution and Bayesian 
MCMC strategy, this chapter (1) estimates the 90th percentile of demand; (2) predicts the 90th 
percentile of demand; (3) computes the posterior and predictive probability distribution of sales 
given the advertising expenditure, demand data, and stochastic regional effects for any sampled 
region or randomly picked region from the population. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the literature on various categories of 
demand estimation models. This section provides us with the deficiencies of these models 
presented in Section 2.3. In an attempt to overcome most of the deficiencies, Section 2.4 presents 
the problem statement and objectives. To solve the current problem of demand estimation at the 
manufacturer, Section 2.5 presents the methodology adopted to achieve the objectives presented 
in Section 2.4. Sections 2.6 and 2.7 explain in detail the MCMC and Bayesian techniques that are 
cited in the methodology section. Section 2.8 contains the model formulation for this solution of 
the problem, followed by a case study and numerical example to reveal the real potential of the 
Bayesian MCMC techniques.  Section 2.10 presents the results and discussions followed by 
Section 2. 11, containing conclusions.  
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2.2 Literature Review 
 
To the best of my knowledge, classical forecasting models are used to predict future demand and 
maximum likelihood estimation techniques (statistical models) are used for estimating demand 
parameters. As explained in introduction, demand can be measured through classical inventory 
management models or demand distribution (statistical) models. But the tools used to estimate 
and predict demand through are different which makes these studies and results interesting. 
Therefore the entire literature review section is categorized into four different models as follows: 
 
 
2.2.1. Mathematical models  
 
These are often categorized as operations research or optimization models. Gurnani and Tang 
(1999) [33] determined the profit maximizing ordering strategies for a retailer who has two 
instances of ordering optimal quantities of seasonal products from a manufacturer. While the 
demand is uncertain, he can definitely improve his forecasts from the first instance to the second 
by observing the market signals. Here they present a nested newsboy problem for determining 
optimal order quantity at each instance. Fisher and Rajaram (2000) [34] use a K-median model to 
cluster the regions of the chain based on a region-similarity measure defined by sales history and 
then choose test regions from each cluster for the purpose of this study. Subsequently, a linear 
programming model is used to fit a formula that is then used to predict sales from the test sales. 
These methods have been used on real-time apparel retailers and shoe retailers; the methods 
showed a significant increase in profits at the apparel retailer.   Lau et al. (2002) [35] do not 
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explicitly estimate or predict demand at the manufacturer but instead study the effect of reducing 
demand uncertainty in a manufacturer-retailer channel.  
 
Most of the models expressed in this section are complicated mathematical models and seldom 
find applicability to real-world problems. Again, not many researchers have focused their 
attention on manufacturers' estimating demand at the regional level. Due to the lower practical 
significance, most of the retailing industry uses typical forecasting methods described in the 
Section 2.2.2 below for estimating demand 
 
2.2.2. Forecasting/Statistical Models:  
 
Lordahl and Bookbinder (1994) [36] proposed a method in which they used an ordered? static 
approach and made no assumptions on the underlying lead time demand distribution or its 
parameters; they also used a only small amount of lead-time demand data to estimate the reorder 
point for an (s,s) inventory system. In a recent paper, Lee, So, and Tang (2000) [37] showed that 
in a two-level supply chain with non-stationary AR(1) end demand, the manufacturer benefits 
significantly when the retailer shares point-of-sale (POS) demand data. Raghunathan (2001) [38] 
shows, both analytically and through simulation, that the manufacturer's benefit is insignificant 
when the parameters of the AR(1) process are known to both parties, as in Lee, So, and Tang 
(LST) (2000) [37]. The key reason for the difference between these results and those of LST is 
that LST assumes that the manufacturer also uses an AR(1) process to forecast the retailer order 
quantity. However, the manufacturer can reduce the variance of its forecast further by using the 
entire order history to which it has access. Thus, where there is sufficiently intelligent use of 
already available internal information (order history), there is no need to invest in inter-
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organizational systems for information sharing. Chen et al. (2000) [39] consider a two-stage 
supply chain with a single retailer and single manufacturer and demonstrate that an exponential 
smoothing forecast of a retailer can cause a bull-whip effect; they contrast these results with the 
increase in variability due to the use of a moving average forecast. Kim and Ryan (2003) [40] 
present an extension of the basic newsvendor model that allows us to quantify the value of the 
observed demand data and the impact of suboptimal forecasting on the expected costs at the 
retailer. This method is demonstrated using an exponential smoothing technique. The model is 
also used to quantify the value of information and information sharing for a decoupled supply 
chain in which both the retailer and the manufacturer must forecast demand. 
 
All these models focus their attention on retail or distribution centers while predicting optimal 
inventory levels. None of the above models use censored demand information for their 
predictions. 
 
2.2.3. Programming Models:  
 
Due to the advancement of technology, there have been many software packages available on the  
market to estimate demand. These packages are designed according to certain heuristics and aim 
to provide good demand predictions for a future period given certain values. Following is the list 
of demand estimation software vendors:[8, 41] 
 
 Analytica is available through Lumina Decision Systems, Inc., and is a manually driven 
software package for forecasting demand. 
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 AUTOBOX can be used as automatic, semi-automatic or manual forecasting software. It 
works on DOS, Linux, UNIX, and Windows operating systems. 
 Crystal Ball is an automatic forecasting software. It works only on Windows. 
 Demand Works DP and Demand Works Smoothie are two software packages supplied by 
Demand Works and work on Windows only. The DP version can be used for automatic, 
semiautomatic, or manual forecasting, whereas the Smoothie version is automatic only.  
 Forecast Pro Unlimited and Forecast Pro XE are two versions available through Business 
Forecast Systems, Inc. These also work on Windows only and are usable for automatic, 
semi-automatic, and manual forecasting. 
 ForecastX Wizard is available through John Galt Solutions and can be used only on the 
Windows platform. Again, this can be used for generating forecasts automatically, semi-
automatically and manually. 
 GAUSS is available through Aptech Systems, Inc., and works on Windows, Linux, and 
Mac OSX and Sun Sparc platforms. The drawback is that it is available only in the 
manual-forecasting version.  
 PEER planner and PEER Forecaster are available through Dalphus, Inc, and work only 
on the Windows platform. This can be used for automatic, semi-automatic, and manual 
forecasting.  
 Minitab, NCSS, SPSS,JMP and SAS These all are statistical software packages and have 
the ability to predict demand when trend, seasonality, cyclical and irregularity data are 
available. These packages have built-in functions that make them automatic; some 
parameters and some methods can be tweaked  to make them semi-automatic; the user 
can also create his or her own values for deseasonalising the data and detrending the data 
and finally get the predictions, which is essentially manual forecasting. 
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 Time Trends Forecast Warehouse Demand Forecasting System is available through ALT-
C Systems, Inc., and works only for Windows. It has automatic, semi-automatic, and 
manual forecasting capabilities.  
 
Most of the software packages mentioned above are built on a statistical understanding of 
forecasting models, such as simple linear and non-linear regression models and exponential 
smoothing techniques for trends and seasonality. Decomposition models are used to tackle 
difficult data sets that don’t show obvious trends and seasonality and have cyclical and irregular 
components in them. ARIMA or Box-Jenkins methods are used for dealing with datasets that will 
not respond to any of the above simpler methods. The drawback of all these models is that they 
cannot include censored information. With censored demand information, it is not easy to tackle 
the data set using traditional forecasting techniques. It is possible to use Cox-regression models to 
implement censored information, but normally these are not as highly recommended in demand 
estimation as they are in lifetime failure data analysis.  
 
2.2.4. Bayesian Models 
 
Most of the literature in supply-chain demand estimation focuses on retailers. Bayesian models 
have gained importance and seen increased practical application recently, even though they have 
been researched since the 1950s. Most of the literature on Bayesian models is focused on 
developing optimal inventory models. Therefore, in this section we will highlight all the studies 
that lead to our ultimate goal.  
 
 25 
Choi et al. (2003) [9] investigate an optimal two-stage ordering policy for seasonal products. 
Before the selling season, a retailer can place orders for a seasonal product from his or her 
supplier at two distinct stages in order to satisfy the lead-time requirement. Market information is 
collected at the first stage and is used to update the demand forecast at the second stage by using 
a Bayesian approach. The ordering cost at the first stage is known, but the ordering cost at the 
second stage is uncertain. A two-stage dynamic optimization problem is formulated and an 
optimal policy is derived using dynamic programming. The optimal ordering policy exhibits 
attractive structural properties and can easily be implemented by a computer program. The 
detailed implementation scheme is proposed. The service level and profit uncertainty level under 
the optimal policy are discussed. Extensive numerical analyses are carried out to study the 
performance of the optimal policy.  
 
Yang et al. (2003) [10] develop a Bayesian method to address the computational challenge of 
estimating simultaneous demand and supply models that can be applied to both the analysis of 
household panel data and to aggregated demand data. The method is developed within the context 
of a heterogeneous discrete choice model coupled with pricing equations derived from either 
specific competitive structures or linear equations of the kind used in instrumental variable 
estimation; the method is then applied to a scanner panel dataset of light beer purchases. But 
again, this study is not solely aimed at the manufacturer, nor does it consider random effects and 
advertising budgets that can act as catalysts in demand estimation. Wu (2005) [42] considers a 
decentralized supply chain consisting of two independent players, a manufacturer and a retailer. 
Under a quantity flexibility contract, the retailer first proposes an initial forecast as the production 
reference to the manufacturer. Then he or she uses the Bayesian procedure to update demand 
information and makes the ultimate purchase commitment, which is constrained by the negotiated 
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flexibility and the manufacturer's production. The incentives of both parties are modeled, and the 
effects of flexibility, transfer cost, and the number of Bayesian updates on the performance of the 
two parties is investigated. Results show that more flexibility always benefits the retailer, while 
the manufacturer can only benefit from a very small range of flexibility. In addition, this contract 
allows them to share the benefits from information updating. 
 
2.3 Limitations of Literature 
 
In the light of the literature review presented above, this section discusses the limitations of 
previous models as follows: 
 
 Classical operation research and forecasting techniques cannot predict demand using 
censored historical data.  
 Commercial software gives an output for what is fed into the computer and does not 
account for random regional effects such as weather, geographical location, population 
density, etc.  
 Frequentist approaches cannot estimate demand with two unknown parameters and 
known demand distribution.  
 None of the models referenced in the literature, whether mathematical or statistical, 




2.4 Problem Statement and Objectives 
 
In this chapter, the problem of demand estimation at the manufacturer, also termed "macroscopic 
demand estimation," is addressed. The macro model estimates regional demand for a single 
product at a manufacturer in the presence of censored and exact sales data while taking into 
consideration the influence of factors such as advertising expenditure and stochastic regional 
effects on the demand for that product. Random regional effects such as regional weather, 
geographical location, population density, family income, etc., are factors that are considered to 
significantly impact the future demand for that product.  
 
In this chapter, the manufacturers demand estimation problem is addressed. A demand estimation 
model is formulated in section 2.5 followed by the explanation of the methodology adopted to 
provide accurate estimates and predictions of demand for a single product manufacturer in section 
2.6 , 2.7 and 2.8. In order to evaluate the real potential of this Bayesian MCMC technique, a case 
study and numerical analysis is presented in sections 2.9. Brief discussion of the numerical results 
of the case study are presented in section 2.10 followed by conclusions in section 2.11. 
 
Figure 2 below is a pictorial representation of this macroscopic level manufacturers' demand 









Figure 2: Describes the situation of a single product manufacturer who serves several regions in order to 
increase .  
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2.5 Model Formulation 
 
The model considered in this study assumes the following: (1) demand data follows a Weibull 
distribution with two unknown (shape and scale) parameters; (2) the shape parameter of the 
demand distribution is not fixed or known, but we have a diffused prior belief about that 
parameter. This makes our model a more generalized version of the problem considered in [27], 
thereby enabling us to avoid the conjugate family concept.  
 
At this point, some common notation that will be used throughout the chapter should be 
introduced. Let ‘y’ represent the inventory and ‘D’ represent the exact and censored demand at 
particular sampled regions. If the sales are less than the inventory on hand, then we have exact 
demand information; alternatively, the demand is at least ‘y’ and is censored. The demand is 
described by a Weibull distribution function with unknown shape and scale parameters β and η,  
respectively [27, 28]. The scale parameter reflects the size of the market and shape parameter 
reflects both market size and the precision with which the underlying distribution is known. The 





















.  (2.6) 
 
2.5.1 Scale Parameter 
 
Let ‘B’ be the allocated advertising expenditure at a particular region. Empirical studies in the 
past have shown that advertising significantly influences demand for a product [32]. Using the 
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concept of advertising expenditure elasticity of demand similar to price elasticity of demand, we 
introduce a log-linear regression-like relation between the advertising expenditure and the 
demand. This log-linear relation is well supported by the real market data of demand dependency 















Integrating on both sides yields: 
 
)Blog()log( 10 γγη +=      (2.7) 
where, γ0 is a constant and γ1 is the advertising expenditure elasticity variable. 
 
While advertising elasticities are less commonly estimated, they can be used to determine 
whether advertising is predatory (rearranging market shares) or cooperative (shifting demand 
out). In addition to this relation, the demand at a region is further influenced by the random 
regions effects. The random regions effect may be associated with the dependence of market size 
on factors such as pricing, availability of substitutable products, geographical location of the 
manufacturer and retailers who sell this product, and many other factors that we don’t consider 
specifically but believe would have a significant impact on the sales of the items from that region. 
Often, these are also called marketing mix variables. The impact of these random regional effects 
on market size is taken into account by adding a random variable ψ to the above log-linear 
relation. That is,  
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ψγγη ++= )Blog()log( 10       (2.8) 
 
where ψ~ N(0, τ) follows a normal distribution with a mean of zero and precision τ which is the 




=τ . This is a common notation used in Bayesian literature.   
Figure 3 below represents the log linear equation (3) for scale parameter.  
 
2.5.2. Shape Parameter 
 


























 .                                           (2.9) 
 
 
Figure 3: Represents log linear relationship of market size(η) with advertising expenditure(B) 
and random regional effects(ψ). 
 
Random regional effects 
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In particular, the variance of demand decreases with increasing β values. Moreover, the shape 
parameter β is intimately related to “demand rate, (λ), defined as the probability that a demand is 
seen in a specified interval ∆d given that there is no demand less than d. Mathematically, the 
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where F(d) is the cumulative demand distribution and f(d) is the demand density. Hence, the 







=λ .      (2.11) 
 
The demand rate λ decreases with time when β < 1; alternatively, λ increases with time whenβ > 
1. For β = 1, the demand rate remains constant and the demand distribution becomes exponential. 
Physically, β < 1 represents an instant success demand scenario (fashion goods, video games 
etc.), β > 1 represents a late success demand scenario, and β = 1 represents random demand for a 
product. [45],[44] 
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2.5.3 Cost Model for Optimal Percentiles 
 
 
Assuming that the ‘"newsvendor" is in fact a small company or manufacturer, as in this case, who 
wants to produce goods for an uncertain market, I use the familiar extended newsvendor cost 
model with holding costs for selecting optimal demand percentile that should be produced in 
order to minimize cost for the manufacturer. This is also termed, "cost-based optimization of 
inventory levels." A generalized version of the cost function for the "newsvendor" (manufacturer) 
is given below[46]: 
 


























On the basis of the cost function, the determination of the optimal inventory level is a 
minimization problem. So in the long run, the amount of the optimal demand percentile to 

















optimal    (2.12) 
 
For the purpose of concreteness, we assume that the costs associated with the above equation are 
such that we obtain 90th percentile of demand as the optimal percentile that the manufacturer 
should consider to minimize costs. This would also be close to reality, as this means that we are 
trying to meet the 90th percent of demand and losing only 10% of sales, assuming that the penalty 




Accurate demand estimation is very important in an integrated supply chain,  mostly because it 
helps avoid bull-whip effects and reduces excess holding and stock-outs.  There has been ample 
research conducted in this area of demand estimation and inventory models, as seen in Section 
2.2. All of this research provides valuable tools and interesting demand models. In the present 
study, utilizing the available tools and demand models from literature, a refined demand model is 
formulated and evaluated. The current micro level demand model attempts to overcome the 
limitations of traditional literature that were presented in Section 2.3. The novelty of this research 
lies in utilizing the well known Bayesian MCMC techniques to solve this demand estimation 
problem in the presence of a combination of factors (advertising expenditure per sampled region, 
random regional effects and a historical data set that contains both exact and censored demand 
data) that has not been considered to date by any of the above referenced researchers. 
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In order to address the issue of censored or missing data, there have been enormous advances in 
the use of the Bayesian methodology for the analysis of inventory management (see section 2.1 
and section 2.2.4) and identifying the optimal policies with known demand distributions and 
parameters. There exist many practical advantages to the Bayesian approach over the classical 
forecasting techniques and optimization models discussed in the section 2.2.4. A great advantage 
of Bayesian models is that they can accommodate unobserved variables, in this case censored 
demand data. The use of prior probability distribution represents a powerful mechanism for 
incorporating information from previous studies and for controlling for confounding data. 
Posterior probabilities can be used as easily interpretable alternatives to p values. Recent 
developments in Markov Chain Monte Carlo methodology facilitate the implementation of 
Bayesian analysis of complex data sets that contain censored and exact values. The goal of this 
chapter is to highlight some advantages and distinct features of the Bayesian analysis of censored 
demand data in the presence of advertising budget and random regional effects in order to take 
advantage of this powerful approach.  
 
2.7 Markov Chain Monte Carlo Technique 
 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, sometimes called random walk Monte Carlo 
methods, are a class of algorithms for sampling from probability distributions based on 
constructing a Markov chain that has the desired distribution as its stationary distribution [47]. 
The state of the chain after a large number of steps is then used as a sample from the desired 
distribution. The quality of the sample improves as a function of the number of steps. Usually it is 
not hard to construct a Markov chain (Ross (2003)[48]) with the desired properties. The more 
difficult problem is to determine how many steps are needed to converge to the stationary 
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distribution within an acceptable error. A good chain will have rapid mixing---the stationary 
distribution is reached quickly starting from an arbitrary position. Tools for proving rapid mixing 
include arguments based on conductance and the coupling method. Typical use of MCMC 
sampling can only approximate the target distribution, as there is always some residual effect of 
the starting position. More sophisticated MCMC-based algorithms such as coupling from the past 
can produce exact samples, at the cost of additional computation and an unbounded (though finite 
on average) running time. The most common application of these algorithms is the numerical 
calculation of multi-dimensional integrals. In these methods, an ensemble of "walkers" moves 
around randomly. At each point where the walker steps, the integrand value at that point is 
counted towards the integral. The walker then may make a number of tentative steps around the 
area, looking for a place with a reasonably high contribution to the integral to move into the next. 
Random walk methods are a kind of random simulation or Monte Carlo method. However, 
whereas the random samples of the integrand used in a conventional Monte Carlo integration are 
statistically independent, those used in MCMC are correlated. A Markov chain is constructed in 
such a way as to have the integrand as its equilibrium distribution. Surprisingly, this is often easy 
to do. 
 
2.7.1  Markov Monte Carlo Techniques  [49] 
 
 Metropolis-Hastings algorithm: Generates a random walk using a proposal density and a 
method for rejecting proposed moves[50]. 
 Gibbs sampling: Requires that all the conditional distributions of the target distribution 
can be sampled exactly. Gibbs sampling has the advantage that it does not display 
random walk behavior. However, it can run into problems when variables are strongly 
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correlated. When this happens, a technique called simultaneous over-relaxation can be 
used[50],[51].  
 Hybrid Markov Chain Monte Carlo: Tries to avoid random walk behavior by introducing 
an auxiliary momentum vector and implementing Hamiltonian dynamics where the 
potential function is the target density. The momentum samples are discarded after 
sampling. The end result of Hybrid MCMC is that proposals move across the sample 
space in larger steps and are therefore less correlated and converge to the target 
distribution more rapidly.  
 Slice sampling: Depends on the principle that one can sample from a distribution by 
sampling uniformly from the region under the plot of its density function. This method 
alternates uniform sampling in the vertical direction with uniform sampling from the 
horizontal "slice" defined by the current vertical position[52].  
 Reversible Jump.  
 
2.7.2  Weaknesses of MCMC techniques 
 
Maximum-likelihood algorithms may not always be able to find the true global maximum of the 
likelihood function. Similarly, MCMC techniques can fail to converge to the stationary 
distribution of the posterior probabilities. Failure to visit all highly probable regions of the 
parameter space because of local maxima in the likelihood curve can be a possible reason for this. 
However poor proposal mechanisms and/or failure to run the chain long enough are usually the 
main cause of sample defect.  
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2.7.3  Applicability of MCMC to SCM 
 MCMC techniques coupled with Bayesian Estimation are used to solve many inventory 
problems in supply-chain management by estimating demand. We update the demand 
information to the central system and then use MCMC techniques to iterate the demand 
values a large number of times, finally obtaining a demand value that is very close to the 
actual demand.  
 Many times there are unobserved lost sales (censored demand) in all the supply chains; 
these MCMC techniques and Bayesian inferences can significantly aid in estimating the 
cost as well as the inventory levels in any kind of inventory system, including the  
dynamic newsvendor model, (S, s) and (Q, r).   
 MCMC techniques can also be used in application areas such as like fashion goods, 
which involve perishable items 
 
2.8 Bayesian Statistics 
 
In this section, we briefly introduce Bayesian analysis concepts and develop a procedure for 
calculating the posterior distributions of the unknown parameters and point estimates of the 
demand . Posterior distributions are critical for all the analysis in Bayesian statistics since these 
distributions contain all the relevant information regarding the unknown parameters for a given 
set of observations on demand. The Bayesian inferences and point estimates are derived from 
these posterior distributions[53, 54, 55, 56]. The main focus of this chapter is to determine the 
demand point estimates along with the lower and upper credibility and prediction intervals [55].  
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2.8.1 Components of Bayesian Inference 
 
 Prior information: the belief or informal estimate we have about the unknown 
parameters. It can be either non-informative or informative. 
 
 Unknown parameters:  the posterior percentiles, shape parameters, scale parameters, etc. 
 
 Missing or censored observations. 
 
 Posterior is critical as it contains all the relevant information regarding unknown 
parameters. 
 
2.8.2 Prior Information  
 
In many real-world scenarios, there is minimal prior information on demand, on inventory, and 
on their respective distributions. This uncertainty in prior information is handled in Bayesian 
statistical analysis through the use of non-informative priors. For example, a non-informative 
prior on the variance of a normal random variable is given by N(0, t), where t is a small number, 
usually taken as 0.001, to represent the uncertainty of the prior information on the precision 
which is the inverse of the variance represented as τ =1/s2 (or large variance) [53, 54] of the 
random variable. We do not consider N (0, 0) for non-informative priors since this represents a 
flat response over the entire number line; consequently, it is "improper" in the sense that there is 
infinite area under the curve. Use of non-informative priors also reduces the task of sensitivity 
analysis as we are not using informative priors and hence are sure that our prior beliefs are not 
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unduly impacting our analysis and results. In this context, we introduce some prior selection 
methods  [53, 54]: 
 
 The classical Bayesian approach assumes that the prior is a necessary evil and the prior 
chosen should interject the least information possible. 
 
 A modern Parametric Bayesian approach acknowledges prior information as a useful 
convenience and chooses prior distributions with desirable properties (e.g. conjugacy). 
Given a distributional choice, prior parameters are chosen to interject the least 
information possible. 
 
 Subjective Bayesian approach considers the prior as a summary of old beliefs and 
chooses prior distributions based on previous knowledge—either the results of earlier 
studies or non-scientific opinion.  
 
The model considered in this chapter for the macroscopic problem of estimating demand at the 
manufacturer has four unknown parameters; namely, γ0, γ1,ψ, and β, of which γ0, γandψ are 
unknown parameters with non-informative priors and β is an unknown with some amount of prior 
information.  We represent the minimal prior information on γ, and γ1 using N (0.0001,0.001).  
The random regional variable ψ is modeled as ),0(N~ τψ , where τis precision. In order to 
represent a lack of sufficient prior information on τ, a gamma  distribution is used for τ. The 
gamma distribution applies to unknown quantities that take values between 0 and ∞ (for example, 
the unknown precision τ of an unknown quantity). Complete ignorance about a positive-valued 
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unknown quantity is generally represented as a Gamma (0, 0) distribution. Since this distribution 
is improper, Gamma (ε, ε) is used in practice, with ε a small number such as 0.001. The inverse 
gamma is a conjugate prior distribution for the normal variance, which is defined as the inverse of 





As mentioned in Section 2, a Weibull distribution is used for modeling demand 
),(~ βηWeibullOt  [Azoury (1985) [21] and Lariviere (2002)[28]].  To represent the prior 
known information on the parameter β,  we use )2.0,1(~ Gammaβ .  
 
2.8.3 Bayesian Updating 
 
Let Ot =( Ot1 ,Ot2 ) denote the demand observation during time period t, where Ot1 is the sales 
quantity, which is known exactly and cannot be negative, while Ot2 is the observed status that can 
be exact or censored. Let us assume that the inventory be yt and demand be Dt during time period 
t. If yt > Dt then sales is Dt  and the observation is exact. Otherwise, the sales quantity is yt and 

















    (2.1) 
where e and c represent exact and censored information, respectively.  
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Let πt(θ) denote the prior distribution of unknown demand parameters θ = (β,η). The 
















tt     (2.2) 


















)|(  .   (2.3) 
 
In the above expression, f(Ot|θ) and F(Ot |θ) denote the probability density and cumulative 
distributions of demand with two unknown parameters θ = (β,η). Using the posterior distributions 
of the unknown parameters, we can estimate the posterior predictive distribution of the demand as 
[57]: 
 
θθπθπ=π ∫ +++ dOODOD tttnewttnewt )|(*),|()|( 111  .              (2.4) 
 
Using posterior distributions we can calculate the point estimates. For example if we are 
interested in calculating the point estimate of the unknown parameters[57]: 
  
θθπθ=θ ∫ + dOf tt )|(*)(
~
1       (2.5) 
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where f(θ)=θ would represent the mean point estimate; similarly, if f(θ)=θ2 it would form the 
second moment point estimate.  
 
In many cases, evaluation of these integrals analytically is not possible. Therefore, Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques [47];[49];[51];[58] are in common use to evaluate these 
integrals numerically. The basic principle underlying MCMC technique is that a Markov chain 
can be constructed with a stationary distribution that is the joint posterior probability distribution 
of the parameters of the model. These Markov chains are defined using standard algorithms such 
as Gibbs sampling or Metropolis Hasting algorithms[57]. Using these algorithms, it is possible to 
implement posterior simulations that form the foundations for all the Bayesian statistical 
inferences.   
 
2.9 Why use Bayesian MCMC ? 
 
Since there exists a historical demand data set which is considered as present data, and the goal is 
to estimate/predict the future demand, this follows the Markovian property that states, “the future 
is independent of the past given the present”; therefore, this forms a Markov chain.  
The historical data set evaluated for future demand contains censored observations. As a result, 
the only statistical tool that can forecast demand is Bayesian statistics.  
The posterior integrals are complicated and pose difficultly in solving manually; consequently, I 
adopt the well known Monte Carlo simulation techniques.  
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For all the reasons enumerated above, the Bayesian MCMC technique is considered the most 
apposite tool to solve this problem of demand estimation for the manufacturer.  
 
2.10 Case Study/Numerical Example 
 
To evaluate the model indicated in this chapter we generate synthetic data and perform Bayesian 
MCMC simulations on the data using the prior information and historical demand data. 
 
2.10.1 Synthetic Data Generation 
 
For the purpose of this research, we considered 30 regions, five advertising expenditure levels, 
and ten weeks of time period, as this would form a large enough data set of 300 demand points. 
We used a percentage sales method [59] to obtain the advertising expenditure and chose 90th 
percentile of demand to represent the censoring point, which is commonly the amount of 
inventory carried during off-peak seasons.  We chose the log-linear regression model presented in 
Section 2 for the dependence of mean demand on the advertising expenditure. The coefficients of 
the regression model were selected such that they were best representative of the real-world 
scenarios. The random regional effects of demand on local advertising expenditure were 
considered to be normally distributed with zero mean and a standard deviation of 0.5 indicative of 
the region-to-region variation of 0.25. Since we are using synthetic data, we used non-informative 
priors on all the unknown parameters in order to minimize their impact on further analysis.  
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2.10.2 Prior Information 
 
In many real-world scenarios, there exists minimal prior information on demand/inventory, and 
their respective distributions. This uncertainty in prior information is handled in Bayesian 
statistical analysis through the use of non-informative priors. For example, a non-informative 
prior on the variance of a normal random variable is given by N(0, τ), where τ is a small number, 
usually taken as 0.001, to represent the uncertainty of the prior information on the precision 
which is inverse of the variance represented as τ =1/σ2 (or large variance) of the random variable. 
We do not consider N (0, 0) for non-informative priors since this represents a flat response over 
the entire number line; consequently, it is "improper" in the sense that there is infinite area under 
the curve (since the area under the curve for a pdf should integrate to 1).  
 
The model considered in Section 2 has four unknown parameters, namely, γ0, γ1,ψ, and β, of 
which γ0, γ1, and ψ are unknown parameters with non-informative priors, and β is an unknown 
with some amount of prior information.  We represent the minimal prior information on γ0, and γ1 




The random regional variable ψ is modeled as ),0(N~ τψ , [60] where τ is precision. In order to 
represent the lack of sufficient prior information on τ, a gamma  distribution is used for τ. The 
gamma distribution applies to unknown quantities that take values between 0 and ∞  (for 
example, the unknown precision τ of an unknown quantity). Complete ignorance about a positive-
valued unknown quantity is generally represented as a Gamma (0, 0) distribution. Since this 
)001.0,0(N~;)001.0,0(N~ 10 γγ
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distribution is improper, Gamma(ε, ε) is used in practice, with ε a small number such as 0.001. 
The inverse gamma is a conjugate prior distribution for the normal variance, which is defined as 




τ =  
 
As mentioned in Section 2, a Weibull distribution is used for modeling demand 
),(Weibull~
t
O βη  [21] and [30].  To represent the prior known information on the parameter β,  




As explained in Section 3, it is very difficult and sometimes impossible to evaluate the integrals 
analytically using common mathematical techniques; therefore, we resort to using Monte Carlo 
simulations. Since our output is dependent on the joint probability distributions generated one 
stage ahead, it forms a Markov chain since the principle underlying Markov chains states that the 
future is independent of the past given the present. Hence, these simulations are called Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo simulations. Since we use a Bayesian paradigm to utilize the present 
information and predict/estimate the future, these simulations are termed Bayesian MCMC .  
 
Using the synthetic data, the priors described above, and the demand model described in Section 
2 we ran the MCMC simulation that used Gibbs algorithm and produced simulated values that 
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were, after a suitable burn-in period, approximately distributed from the posterior distribution of 
the parameter of interest or the predictive distribution of the new observation. To provide more 
precise results, we ran our program five times for one million iterations with a burn-in period of 
10,000 iterations [50]. This number of iterations was justified as sufficient to obtain samples from 
the posterior and predictive distributions of interest by using trace plots that showed excellent 
convergence patterns for the parameters of interest. We also ran the programs for two million 
iterations and found no appreciable difference in the estimates obtained. 
. 
2.11 Results and Discussions 
 
Using the code in WINBUGS (http://www.mrc-bsu.cam.ac.uk/bugs/) and the simulated data, 
posterior and predictive distributions were obtained. These posterior distributions help us in 
attaining the point estimates, credibility intervals and prediction intervals at optimal demand 
percentiles for the next time period and also for any random regions and random advertising 
expenditure from either the sampled regions or from the population of regions. We use 90th 
demand percentiles (section 2.3) so as to avoid lost sales or excess inventory carryovers. Since we 
do not consider any promotional effects, the model predictions  would reflect the time periods 
where there isn’t any promotional activity. Promotional effects can be incorporated in the demand 
equation as a function of sales data but this would create more complexity to the already complex 
censored demand problem.  Since we use a Bayesian approach, interpretation of the bounds will 
be slightly different compared to the frequentist approach.  
  
The tables below indicate that we are 95% sure that the 90th percentile of posterior demand lies 
between 2.5% and 97.5%. Since the posterior densities are right skewed heavy tailed distributions 
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we consider that the optimal 90th posterior percentile is the median indicated in the tables for 
simplicity. For all practical purposes using some other cost model or some other criteria, if we 
expect our 90th posterior percentile to be anything else above or below the median , this could be 
easily computed from the simulation with the built in capability of the WINBUGS software. 
 
The credibility intervals for the results shown in following tables, between 2.5% and 97.5% imply 
we have 95% credibility that can be interpreted as : we would give odds of 19 to 1 that the true 
value of the parameter (percentile) is contained within these particular limits.  
 
If the table is reporting 90th percentile point estimates then the interval is called credibility 
interval. On the other if the table is reporting 90th percentile predictions for future demand, then 
the interval is termed prediction interval. Either ways, the interpretation is very similar for both 
the intervals as described above.  
 
Table 1 presents 90th percentile point estimates for two assigned advertising expenditure. $23400 
advertising budget was chosen since it was less than the lowest advertising expenditure value 
shown in historical data. Similarly  $47000 advertising expenditure was chosen because it is the 
closest larger number than the maximum advertising money spent as seen in the historical data.   
 
Similarly table 2 presents 90th percentile posterior predictions at $23400 and $47000 advertising 
expenditure for all the sampled regions.  
 
Table 3 and 4 report probability that predicted demand would be less than $100,000 and $170,000 
respectively. This kind of information is important while making inventory management 
decisions by manufacturers in anticipation of future demand.  
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Table 1:Point estimates for 90th percentile demand at (a) 23400 random advertising expenditure & (b) 
47000 random advertising expenditure. 
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Table 2:Bayesian fit for a random effects model with Gamma (1, 0.2) prior on the shape parameter of the 
Weibull distribution for Demand. Prediction Intervals for the demand generated from each of the 30 




Table 3: Probability of Demand at a given time period will be greater than $100000 for each of the thirty 






Table 4:Probability of Demand at a given time period will be greater than $170000 for each of the thirty 





2.11.1 Posterior Density  
  
 
In this section we graphically express smoothed kernel posterior estimates of the parameters of 
interest for random regions only. (Graphical posterior densities for all the sampled regions and 
other tables will be provided on request). These posterior densities play a major role in 
determining the optimal values for the 90th percentile of demand. Since these densities are right 
skewed heavy tailed distributions we presume that the optimal value for the 90th percentile would 
be median. Figures 4 and 5 are indicative of the posterior right skewed densities of the 90th 
percentiles.  
 
                                 
 
                   
 
  quan23400random chains 1:2 sample: 400002
    0.0 1.00E+6 2.00E+6 3.00E+6




Figure 4:Heavily right skewed posterior density 
for a random region selected from the 
population of regions at $23400 advertising 
Figure 5:Heavy tailed right skewed posterior 
density distribution for parameter estimates 
at 90th percentile demand for $23.4K 
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2.11.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 
A sensitivity analysis is performed using different region-to-region variation. To demonstrate the 
effect of  increasing region-to-region variation table 5, table 6, table 7 and table 8present the 90th 
percentile credibility and prediction intervals for a randomly selected region from the population 
of regions to which the manufacturer sells his product. These tables compare the intervals for two 
different stochastic regional effects of 0.5 and 1.5 standard deviation. 
In all the tables above “Random region” corresponds to a region selected randomly from the 
population of regions nationwide from this retail chain with a region to region standard deviation 
of 0.5 . 
 
Median demand corresponds to the 90th percentile posterior estimate that should be produced in 
order to avoid excess inventory holding costs or stock-out situations at the manufacturers end. 
 
The CL stands for credibility limits interpreted according to the Bayesian paradigm, similar to 
confidence limits in frequentist literature. These Lower and Upper CL correspond respectively to 
the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the posterior distribution. The credibility intervals in table 5, 
table 7 and table 8 are extremely wide for larger variation. This is a clear indication of direct 
relation of wider intervals to increasing region-to-region variation finally leading to less reliable 
predictions. 
 
PL stands for prediction limits. Lower PL is the 2.5th percentile and Upper PL is the 97.5th 
percentile of posterior prediction distribution. The region between this range can be interpreted 
as: 95% probability of seeing future demand to fluctuate between the lower and upper prediction 
 55 
limits for the given advertising budgets. Once again, the prediction intervals indicated in table 6 
are large for larger variation indicating no sufficient evidence in favor of the predictions. 
 
Table 7 and Table 8 report 90th percentile posterior point estimate for the probability of demand 
greater than $100000 when the advertising expenditure is lower end of the horizon $23400 and 
$170000 while the advertising expenditure is upper end of the horizon $47000 respectively. 
 
Both tables 7 and 8 indicate that the probabilities attained when the standard deviation associated 
with stochastic regional effects is higher the probabilities attained are flaky prediction. 
 
All the tables below indicate that there exists significant region-to region variation that translates 
to unsatisfactory predictions, probabilities and estimates. 
 
 
Table 5:Point estimates for random region at 90th percentile demand at (a) $23.4K ; and  (b) $47K 





 Table 6:Bayesian fit demand model with Gamma (1, 0.2) prior on the shape parameter of the Weibull . 
Prediction Intervals for random regions with region to region variation of 0.5 and 1.5 for (a) $23400 (b) 




Table 7:Probability of Demand .for a random region with region to region variation of 0.5 and 1.5 in a 




Table 8:Probability of Demand .for a random region with region to region variation of 0.5 and 1.5 in a 













2.11.3 Convergence of the Simulation 
 
 
Since MCMC simulation is applied to synthetic data,  a check for convergence is performed that 
indicates the reliability of this approach. In order to check for convergence, trace plots of the 
posterior observations are graphed. Check for convergence is important in case of simulations 
especially using synthetic data as it shows us that we have reached the optimal solution, using the 
simulation techniques and data. Below are the some trace plots which show zero convergence for 
random regions and also some of the sampled regions. In this chapter two chain are run 
simultaneously[50]. The trace plots show each chain in a different color. Figure 5 and 6 indicate 
convergence due to overlapping trace plots for both the chains.  
 
Looking at figures 6 and 7,  I am reasonably confident that convergence has been achieved since 




Figure 6 :Trace plot for checking convergence for 90th percentile point estimates of demand for a random 
region selected from the population of regions at $23.4K & $47K advertising expenditure.
    Chain1 (blue) 
     Chain 2 (red) 
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Figure 7:Predictions trace plots for checking convergence  for 15 of the 30 sampled regions at $47000 
advertising expenditure 
 
    Chain1 (blue) 
     Chain 2 (red) 
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2.11.4 Accuracy Evaluation 
 
 
Once it is ensured that convergence has been achieved, we need to run the simulation for a further 
number of iterations to obtain samples that can be used for posterior inference. The more samples 
we save, the more accurate we will be about our posterior estimates. Hence we run the simulation 
for one million iterations five times and two million iterations twice and did not find appreciable 
difference.  
 
One way to assess the accuracy of the posterior estimates is by calculating the Monte Carlo 
error(MC error) for each parameter [50]. This is an estimate of the difference between the mean 
of the sampled values (which we are using as our estimate of the posterior mean for each 
parameter) and the true posterior mean. As a rule of thumb, the simulation should be run until the 
MC error for each parameter of interest is less than about 5% of the sample standard deviation 
[50]. Tabulated below are some of the results indicating MC error is less than 5% of the sample 
standard deviation for estimations, and predictions at $23,400 advertising budget for random 
regions.  
 
Table 9 clearly indicates MC error is less than 5% of the sample standard deviation (sd) at one 
millionth iteration for the 90th percentile estimate of demand. MC error from table 10 is also 
below 5% of the sample standard deviation which means that the accuracy of this simulation is 
very good hence one can be certain about the predictions even though we have wider prediction 
intervals.  
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Table 9 : Estimation accuracy for 90th percentile demand verified for a random region selected from the 
population of regions at $23,400 advertising expenditure . 
 
 
Table 10: Prediction accuracy for 90th percentile demand verified for all the thirty sampled regions at 
$47000 advertising expenditure. 
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2.12 Conclusions 
 
When analyzing data, parameters of statistical models are typically not the quantities of interest. 
Indeed, we are interested in functions of parameters, such as predicted values [61, 62] Using 
Bayesian methods makes it easy to compute any type of quantities of interest, and propagate the 
uncertainty about parameters into uncertainty about these quantities. Current study focuses on 
how to make credible demand estimations and reliable predictions from censored and uncensored 
data which is collected from different regions that are different from each other which is 
translated to random regional effects or regions to regions variation presented in section 2 of the 
demand model.  
 
In this application the credibility intervals obtained are fairly narrow compared to the prediction 
intervals which is always true since we are trying to predict optimal demand in a follow up period 
for an exact regions which is more uncertain compared to predicting average demand for all the 
regions combined. Therefore we have wider prediction intervals compared to credibility intervals.  
 
Random regional effects (ψ−presented in section 2.2) also plays a significant role in estimation 
and prediction of demand values at 90th percentile. In order to see the effect of regions to regions 
variation we performed a sensitivity analysis by increasing the standard deviation associated with 
regions to regions variation to 1.5 which produced very large credibility and prediction intervals. 
This calls into question our ability to make statements about the reliability of the predictions and 
estimations of demand in the future period given this advertising budget and demand for the 
present for large regional variations. However, the results discussed in this paper give us an idea 
of how to apply tools like Bayesian MCMC techniques to real world scenarios which is very 
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important. This kind of analysis might be of interest to manufacturers of single products, who 
would like to predict their demand or to retail chains for different parameters of interest in order 





























 64  
Abstract 
 
Second phase of this dissertation examines the influence of competition among the supply chain 
partners on demand for a product. Competition among the manufacturers and retailers is 
introduced through the product pricing decisions and the shelf space allocated for each of the 
products and their substitutes, which have significant impact on product’s demand. In this 
chapter, game theory based methodologies are employed since competition within and among 
supply chain partners is considered critical. In particular, we consider Cournot and Stackelberg 
games to account for competing pricing decisions and shelf space allocation strategies. The 
impact of shelf space allocated to substitutable products on demand is studied by considering a 
game between two manufacturers who are competing for shelf space allocation at a single 
retailer. Subsequently, the combined effect of pricing competition among retailers and the 
manufacturers through their substitutable products is modeled by considering a game that 
includes two manufacturers competing for shelf space allocation at two competing retailers. In 
each of the games, Nash equilibrium is achieved by optimizing the profit functions, which results 
in optimal pricing and shelf space allocations. Numerical results presented in this chapter indicate 
that (1) Cournot games are most profitable along the whole supply chain than Stackelberg games, 
and (2) Lower the retail price translates to lower wholesale price that implies greater the shelf 
space allocated for that product (3) Manufacturers can use their prices as valuable tools to 
intervene into the process of decision making at the retailers.  
 
Keywords: Nash equilibrium, Cournot game, Stackelberg game, shelf space allocation, pricing 
decisions, cooperative, non-cooperative, direct and cross elasticities, retailers and manufacturers. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2, a macro-level demand estimation model at the manufacturer level in a supply chain 
is presented. This model is capable of estimating regional demand for a single product at a 
manufacturer in the presence of censored and exact sales data, while taking into consideration the 
influence of factors such as advertising/marketing expenditure and stochastic regional effects. 
This chapter presents a micro-level demand estimation model that calculates optimal demand 
values at the retailer level of a supply chain.  
 
Demand estimation for a product at the retail level of a supply chain is crucial for a variety of 
management decisions, such as the ideal product assortment to carry, how much of each item 
should be stocked, and how often the stock should be replenished. Studies such as those done by 
Gruen et al. (2002) [63], who examined consumer response to stock-outs across eight categories 
at retailers worldwide, point to the importance of demand estimation for retailers. This study 
reported that during a stock-out, 45% of customers will substitute, i.e., buy one of the available 
items from that category; 15% will delay purchase; 31% will switch to another store; and 9% will 
not buy any item at all. That is, this study suggests that when faced with stock-outs, consumers 
will often either buy substitute items at the same retailer or switch to another store. These 
numbers also highlight the importance of competition among substitutable products and 
competition among retailers in terms of their pricing decisions on demand estimation.  
 
Typically, competition among equally viable (from a product pricing and substitutability points of 
view) products is achieved at a retailer level by the amount of shelf space allocated for each of the 
products. Since the amount of shelf space allocated for a product significantly impacts the sales 
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volume of that product, retailers regularly make decisions about the types of products to display 
(product assortment) and the amount of shelf space to allocate for each of the products thereby 
influencing customers' purchasing decisions [64].  
 
Another critical aspect of a product's demand curve is the price elasticity of the product, i.e., how 
much of that product is demanded when the price changes. The price elasticity of demand 
underlines the importance of price in estimating demand for a product [65]. Typically, price 
elasticity of demand is negative implying that consumers might buy more of a product at lower 
prices and less at higher prices, all other things being equal. Warehouse/retail outlets such as 
Costco and Sam’s Club are examples of this. On the other hand, price elasticity of demand may 
occasionally become positive implying that higher the price higher the demand. Such an anomaly 
can be traced back to the perceived notion that the product with a higher price either offers higher 
quality or more operational features in which case substitutability of the competing products is 
not well understood. In such cases, personal preferences and brand name management come to 
forefront. The demand estimation for these types of products is not considered in this chapter   
 
The purpose of this chapter/study is to introduce a microscopic local demand estimation model at 
the retailer level. This micro model estimates the optimal demand faced by the retailer when 
attempting to make optimal pricing and shelf-space allocation decisions. In particular, demand in 
the micro phase is evaluated in the presence of competition among retailers and manufacturers 
through their competing substitutable products, shelf-space allocation for their respective 
products, and pricing decisions.  
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3.2 Literature Review 
 
Most retailers face challenges such as how to respond to consumer’s ever-changing demands and 
how to adapt themselves to keen competition in dynamic market. Therefore retailers need to 
frequently make decisions about which products to display (assortment) and how much shelf 
space to allocate these products. Shelf space is an important resource for retail stores since great 
quantities of products compete for the limited shelf space at display. Shelf space along with 
pricing decisions play a vital role in increasing or decreasing sales volume or future demand for a 
product as well as its substitute. Plethora of research has been conducted in the areas of demand 
estimation using various tools and techniques.  Therefore the literature review section has been 
categorized on basis of the tools and techniques used to estimate demand mostly at retailers. 
Below are the summaries of each categories. 
 
3.2.1. Statistical Models 
 
The business of a retailer is not only to provide services to his customers but also space to his 
suppliers/manufacturers while making appropriate pricing decisions in order to withstand 
competition from other retailers selling same products. Cairns (1962)[66] in his study indicates 
that models of market behavior assume that the customer gets his goods directly from the 
manufacturer and stresses that there has been little attention given to the relation between 
manufactures, retailers, customers and sales of a product.. Cairns (1963)[67] proposed a graphical 
solution for the problem of allocating shelf space to two products in order to maximize total gross 
profit, taking space elasticity into account. His method may be extended to the case of many 
products. Some basic rules for the allocation of shelf space are used in the industry. In the best 
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known of these rule the proportion of  the available shelf space allocated to a product equals its 
contribution to some measure of profit. But this was unable to provide us with the responses of 
sales to changes in shelf space. Subsequently, Cox (1964) [68] tested whether food sales are 
responsive to shelf space or not. In particular sales of impulses are effected more than staples. 
Using a 6x6 Latin square design for a large supermarket chain Cox (1964) [68] rejected the 
original hypothesis that sales of impulses is more effected than staples. This study also indicated 
how distortion of variation between regions and time periods can be statistically eliminated. But 
this study couldn’t give us interaction effects and competition for shelf space between 
manufacturers. Similarly, Banks (1965) [69] uses a 4x4 Latin square design as, it was felt that a 
mechanical dispenser was necessary for sales to reach the highest volume possible when this 
product was offered in drug regions or other sources of fountain sales. 
 
Cox (1964) [68]and Banks (1965)[69] used single and double Latin square design for conducting 
experiments. They use single square design because it avoided repeated measures through time. 
The double Latin square design involves one replication of the single square. It was used to 
increase the power of the design and to establish the reliability of the results. But these couldn’t 
not be used for different retail chain like a drug regions as they don’t have enough degrees of 
freedom. Hence Kotzan and Evanson (1969) [70]considered a replicated balanced Latin square 
design and conducted a study to examine the sales effect of altering product shelf facings of four 
selected products in a chain drug store environment. The specific objective of this study was to 
isolate statistically the sales to shelf facing relationship and ascertain whether this relationship 
was significant. But Kotzan et al (1969) did not attempt to determine why a significant 
relationship existed. Subsequently, Frank and Massy (1970)[71] report that a cross-sectional 
analysis of the effects of shelf position and space on sales for a frequently purchased branded 
grocery product. This study uses the ideas of design of experiments and is concerned with 
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answering questions like effect of varying the number of facings of a brands shelf display. In this 
study it was found that regular or best selling size items were affected by space changes more 
than were off size (largest or smallest size) items and only a modest effect to varying the shelf 
level at which a product was normally sold and they noted no significant interaction between the 
effects of shelf space on sales. Curhan (1972)[72] hypothesized that space elasticity was a 
function of products physical properties, merchandising characteristics and use characteristics. 
However, eleven independent variables explained but 1% of the variance in space elasticity for 
493 experimental changes. Still elasticity was higher for private brands that for store brands and 
for impulse as opposed to staple items. Space allocation in UK grocery retailing is the topic of 
interest to many researchers, therefore they used other statistical tool available like PCA 
(principal component analysis). Davies & Ward (2000) [73] in their study indicated the of 
principal component analysis techniques over six variables that were identified on basis of 
questionnaires returned to the authors. The final model developed using PCA and structured 
equation modeling approaches had two clusters of externally related variables and four clusters of 
internally related variables and this model was able to capture 70% of the total richness in the full 
48 variable set of responses. The expert retail opinion given on this final model by four willing to 
participate retailers was there is no evidence of the use of a systematic algorithmic support for the 
interrelationships uncovered in this study.  Thus by having systematically examined management 
insight the generated model should be uniquely well placed to represent the interaction of 
variables at fixture category and store level. However the present form of the model does not 
allow the development of decision support.  
 
The limitations encountered in frequentist statistical approaches such as expensive models due to 
replication, complication in setting up experiments, difficulties associated with data collection 
and the lack of generalized conclusions for a group or class of products led to the next category of 
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research models in shelf space allocation literature known as Operations research and/or  
optimization models also known as mathematical models.  
 
3.2. 2. Optimization and Operation Research  
 
Urban (1969) [74] in his paper develops an interesting mathematical model of the interaction 
among products for normative strategy recommendations. The model includes aggregate product 
group marketing mix, product interdependency, and competitive brand effects. Although 
reasonable descriptive adequacy was found it would be useful to have an information system that 
builds a data band on the products performance to obtain more accurate input estimates and to test 
more complex response forms. This kind of models lead to the invention of models that could 
also optimize brand selection along with optimal shelf space allocation. Anderson and Amato 
(1974)[75] realizing the importance came up with a mathematical model for simultaneously 
determining optimal brand selection and shelf space allocation. They addressed a short term 
resource allocation problem faced by a retail distribution and breaks up the total market demand 
according to various levels of brand preferences that could conceivably exist in final markets and 
then employ an algorithm similar to the one used to solve fixed charge problem to find optimal 
brand mix and display area allocation, but this methodology did not address assortment issues or 
elasticities involved. Hansen and Heinsbroek (1979) [76]were the first few to develop an 
optimization model and an algorithm for the simultaneous optimal selection among a given set of 
products of the assortment of products to be sold in a supermarket and the allocation of shelf 
space to these products.  They used a nonlinear demand function which incorporates individual 
space-elasticities but disregards cross-elasticities from similar products. Binary variables for 
handling assortment decisions are included but again there is no cross-elasticity.  Subsequently, 
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Crostjens and Doyle (1981,1983)[12, 77] criticized the models developed by Hansen and 
Heinsbroek (1979)[76] and Anderson and Amato (1974) [75]they ignore the interactions that can 
exist between different products in the store, that is, substitution or complementary effects. These 
authors suggested a model that takes into account main and cross-space elasticities, different 
product profit margins, and inventory-management costs. Their results indicate that retailers are 
better off when they allow more space to the products with higher margins and higher space 
elasticity when the products are substitutes. A drawback in Corstjens and Doyle (1981, 1983)[12, 
77] is that their models do not provide integer solutions as requested in such problems. Zufreyden 
(1986) [78] suggested an integer-programming model with only main elasticity effects of 
shelfspace and nonspace variables. The author did not indicate any rule suggesting an optimal 
allocation of shelf space. However, the reported simulation results show that the higher the space 
elasticity, the higher the allocated shelf space. Bultez and Naert (1988) [79] in their S.H.A.R.P’s 
model formulate the shelf-space-allocation problem as a standard mathematical programming one 
and provide an allocation rule that gives priority to items whose displays are the most profitable. 
Dreze et. al (1994) [80] performed a series of field studies to measure the effectiveness of  two 
shelf management techniques “space-to-movement” and “product reorganization” as they realized 
that shelf space allocation followed rules of thumb to guide them in practice. Using the results of 
their field study they concluded that location of the item had larger impact on sales of the product 
relative to changes in the number of facings allocated to a brand as long as minimum threshold 
(to avoid stock-outs) was maintained in a retail store. However, Urban (1998) [11]suggested a 
heuristic that allocates the shelf space by removing at each iteration the item in the assortment 
with the lowest contribution to profits. The procedure stops when profits start to decrease. 
Building on Corstjens and Doyle (1981)[12], Borin et al (1994) [13] used an elaborated version of 
the same demand function to allow for simultaneous decisions about assortment selection and 
shelf space allocations. Even Yang and Chen (1999) [14]used the simplified version of the same 
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demand formulation by not including the cross-elasticities and assumed that a products profit is 
linear within a small number of facings which are constructed by the products lower and upper 
bound of the number of facings. Both the models developed in[13, 14] have the following 
disadvantages : they concentrate on the revenue aspect and ignore the cost of the operations 
explicitly. For example smaller the shelf space allocated to a product greater the frequency of 
restocking that item, which thereby increases the restocking cost. Bookbinder and Zaccour (2001) 
[81] proposed an optimization model that provides the percentage of space allocated to each item 
based on direct product profitability. Yang (2001) [82] built an algorithm similar to the one used 
for solving the knapsack problem. Shelf space is allocated according to brand weight, measured 
by the ratio of sales profits per display area. The allocation is done after the satisfaction of the 
space availability constraint.  
 
Irion et. al. (2004) [83] also developed a demand model similar to Crostjens and Doyle 
(1981,1983) [12, 77] by introducing certain marketing variables in the demand function through 
general production terms. They use piecewise linearization techniques to solve for the optimal 
shelf space allocation through retailers profit function. Most of the studies addressed in this 
section do not account for the pricing competition as well as substitution issues. Moreover most 
of the models described here are rarely implementable in real world. Therefore some big 
corporations came forward to develop some commercial software that could solve the problem of 
shelf space allocation and assortment strategies based on heuristics.  
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3. 2. 3. Commercial Software 
 
Since computers gained importance there have been many computer codes written so as to ease 
this process of shelf space allocation. But not all were really successful. Zurfryden (1986) ([84] 
developed a program that applies modeling principles and have gained many customers within 
the retailing industry due to their general simplicity and easily implementable decisions. The use 
of planogram software however, enables a user to do much more advanced and detailed analysis. 
Most planogram programs even automatically add product images to products, in addition to 
providing dynamic shading and labeling to better show opportunities in the set. One step further 
is to automate the production of planograms where a retailer or merchandiser requires many 
planograms to be produced at once, based on store specific data.Consequently most retailers use 
these tools to planogram accounting which would help reduce manual labor hours spent 
manipulating the shelves  Today there are several PC-based software programs that can provide 
the retailers with realistic view of the shelves and are capable of allocating shelf space according 
to simple heuristics such as turnover, gross profit or margin, using handling and inventory costs 
as constraints. There are a number of companies offering planogram creation software 
 
 QUANT: This is a new generation of complex space management solutions. It is built on 
innovative planogram creation software Quant Studio (available for Windows, Macintosh 
and Linux) allows automating the creation of many planograms respecting real measures 
of shelves at once. Internet portal iQuant and connected technologies allow dynamic 
distribution of planograms to stores, fast feedback from stores to merchandiser and 
presentation of analyzed data. 
 JDA INTACTIX  : This software offers a variety of space management solutions including 
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Space Planning, formerly known as Pro Space. 
 PLANO GRAPHICS: This planogram software is one of the least expensive, most 
innovative planogramming solutions available. Plano Graphics is widely used in the US, 
Europe and Asia and is available for both Windows and Macintosh. 
 DESIGNER WORKSTATION : Is automated planogram production software developed 
by IRI and distributed in the UK by Retail Smart Ltd. Retail smart offer a range space 
planning solutions where range management decisions are made according to essentially 
derived data - based on the performance of 'space to sales'. 
 SPACEMAN developed by ACNielsen offers a wide range of space management 
solutions. 
 SHELF LOGIC sells three versions of its low-cost, dedicated planogramming software 
and has a user base spanning the full range of businesses from the smallest to the largest 
and includes manufacturers, retailers, distributors, sales forces, importers and more. 
 MARKETMAX: Provider of merchandise analysis, planning, and optimization solutions. 
Their Planogram Manager is a PC-based application for developing planogram. 
 SPACEMATE: Ingen Spacemate is software for creating, viewing and editing planogram. 
Various rules can be applied to the products in order to produce an optimal planogram 
 METERMAN: This is an example of a trend, where the manufacturer, in this case 
Sandberg, offers a planogram service to their own dealers. Meter Man is unique due to 
the fact that it is free of charge, it designs the planogram automatically from given 
parameters, it's switchable between boxes and photographic product facings, and the 
same software combines automated reordering plus an advances but easy-to-use statistics 
module. Meter Man does also take care of price tag printing, design of reordering lists 
etc. But at present it does only work with Sandberg's own products. 
 COSMOS: This is based on a rule developed by Buzzell, Salmon and Vancil (1965) [85] 
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that removes the least profitable item and allocated the space to most profitable ones.  
 APPOLLO: The Apollo Space Management System is powerful software to help retailers 
and manufacturers increase profits by managing shelf space wisely. Using it, retailers can 
directly assess the financial performance of a recommended shelf set. Combined with 
InfoScan data, Apollo is a powerful tool to manage distribution and shelf space. 
TotalStore™ applies Apollo algorithms to the entire store, enabling retailers to improve 
space productivity for stores, departments, aisles, gondolas, sections, shelves or items. 
 
The drawback of such computer programs or systems arises from their incompetence to capture 
the demand effects. Since these softwares suffered some drawbacks, corporate America funded  
researchers to conduct research in the area of shelf space allocation, which lead to the famous 
Beer and diapers study. Researchers called this area artificial intelligence or data mining. From 
that time on the field of data mining fast spread its wings into retail world.  
 
3. 2. 4.Artificial Intelligence/data Mining Models 
 
During the past decade, there have been a variety of significant developments in data mining 
techniques. Some of these developments are implemented in customized service to develop 
customer relationship. Customized service is actually crucial in retail markets. Marketing 
managers can develop long-term and pleasant relationships with customers if they can detect and 
predict changes in customer behavior. In the dynamic retail market, understanding changes in 
customer behavior can help managers to establish effective promotion campaigns. Not until the 
famous example of beers and diapers hit the retailing ground was data mining popular. This 
example that is cited everywhere created a revolution in shelf space allocation literature and 
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exposed certain consumer buying behavior patterns that lead to further analysis in this area using 
data mining techniques. The most frequented approaches are market basket analysis, association 
rules, support vector machines a few to start with. There have been occasions where researchers 
used wavelet theories and other complex tools of data mining to deal with shelf space allocation 
problems. Russell and Pertersen (2000) [86] present a new approach to market basket analysis by 
assuming that choice in one category impacts choice in other categories. This actually implies 
that the researcher can specify the probability that the consumer will actually pick another item 
given he has picked a certain item and finally show that by using these condition choice models, 
it is possible to infer the market basket distribution that explains purchasing in all categories. This 
paper adds competition to its dimension which helps us understand the placement of items on 
shelf for betterment of retailers profits. Chen, Chiu and Chang (2005) [87] in their article 
integrate customer behavioral variables, demographic variables, and transaction database to 
establish a method of mining changes in customer behavior. For mining change patterns, two 
extended measures of similarity and unexpectedness are designed to analyze the degree of 
resemblance between patterns at different time periods. The proposed approach for mining 
changes in customer behavior can assist managers in developing better marketing strategies. 
These would help in identifying the placement of products on shelves.  
 
The more sophisticated mining techniques, like the effect of spatial relationship such as shelf 
space adjacencies of distinct items, are superior to traditional approaches in retail knowledge 
discovery, such as the market basket analysis or frequent-buyer program [88]. In some cases, the 
fact that items sell well together is obvious, such as laundry detergent and fabric softener, 
greeting cards and seasonal candy, or coffee and coffee makers. Occasionally, however, the fact 
that certain items would sell well together is far from obvious, such as in the case of diapers and 
beer [89]or bottled juice and cold remedies . The true reason behind such purchase patterns 
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remain unclear; it may be due to their close proximity in shelf location or other consumer 
behavior we have yet to discover. In this regard, the market basket analysis or frequent-buyer 
program is unable to provide satisfactory results. The proposed scheme attempts to dig for 
obscure clues by introducing the spatial relationship and transaction time information into the 
mining techniques. The visual effect of adjacency can stimulate impulse purchases that account 
for 70% of buying decisions in a supermarket [14]. In light of this potential, Chen, Chen and 
Tung (2006) [90] in their paper attempt to discover the implicit, yet meaningful, relationship 
between the relative spatial “distance” of displayed products and the items' unit sales in a retail 
store using data mining techniques. Special focus is placed on building a novel representation 
scheme for the historical transaction data and on developing an efficient and robust algorithm for 
knowledge mining. The proposed approaches measure and classify the effects of spatial 
adjacency of distinct items on increased sales. Recently, Chen and Lin (2007) [91] utilize a 
popular data mining approach, association rule mining, instead of space elasticity to resolve the 
product assortment and allocation problems in retailing. In this paper, the multi-level association 
rule mining is applied to explore the relationships between products as well as between product 
categories. Because association rules are obtained by directly analyzing the transaction database, 
they can generate more reliable information to shelf space management.  
 
Even though data mining is fairly new field, it still suffers drawbacks. One obvious limitation is  
none of these models address the issue of competition among supply chain partners. They either 
look at the retailers or manufacturers profit functions but not both for making decisions. 
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3. 2. 5. Game Theory models 
 
Marketing science literature has often adopted Game theory as a possible technique to deal with 
possible issues of cooperation, non-cooperation and competition among the members of a 
marketing channel. Most these papers cited in this section address the issues such as pricing, 
marketing expenditures, and profit sharing, that could induce cooperation into the marketing 
channel. A stream of literature has adopted a differential game formalism to analyze conflicts and 
coordination in marketing channels. Chintagunta and Jain (1992) [16]adopted differential game 
strategy to examine the effect of channel dynamics on the difference in profits resulting from 
following coordinated as opposed to uncoordinated strategies and identify situations in which this 
profit differential provides an incentive for channel members to coordinate their marketing 
efforts. Subsequently, Jorgensen and Zaccour (1999) [17] proposed a differential game model for 
analyzing the relationship between the two firms under conflict and coordination and also 
conclude on pricing and advertising strategies for both the firms under consideration. Moscarini 
and Ottaviani (2001) [92] in their paper investigate price competition in presence of private 
information on demand side. In this article two retailers are selling different brand of the same 
product to a customer endowed with a private binary signal on their relative quality. This model 
provides a platform to differentiation in Hotelling’s price competition game. The results of this 
study (1) competition is fierce when the prior strongly favors one seller and private signals are 
relatively uninformative. (2) Sellers equilibrium profits may fall with the revelation of public 
information and are non-monotonic in the prior belief. Although there exists abundant literature 
applying game theory to demand, advertising, pricing and coordination, it is only recently that a 
few studies have concentrated on the issue of shelf-space allocation using game theory concepts.  
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Wang and Gerchak (2001) [64], the shelf-space-allocation issue is examined as a coordinating 
tool in the marketing channel. Two kinds of channel structures (a channel composed of a single 
manufacturer selling its product through an exclusive dealer, a bilateral monopoly, and a channel 
with a monopolist manufacturer and two competing retailers) are studied in order to determine if 
a holding-cost subsidy, designed by the manufacturer to push retailers into allocating more shelf 
space to their products can maximize total channel profits. Despite the interesting insights given 
by this study, the fact that each retailer handles the product of a single manufacturer makes the 
issue of shelf-space allocation less interesting than in channel structures in which competing 
manufacturers battle to acquire the highest share of the space. Furthermore, in Wang and Gerchak 
(2001)[64], retail and wholesale prices are exogenous. proposed a differential game formalism for 
determining the shelf-space allocation by a retailer for her two competing brands. To be able to 
characterize feedback Stackelberg equilibrium, they assumed that the two brands’ manufacturers 
behave myopically, i.e. each player observes only the evolution of her brand goodwill stock.   
 
Jorgensen, Taboubi and Zaccour (2003)[93] consider a single manufacturer and a single retailer, 
where the manufacturer advertises on national media and retailer promotes the brand locally. 
They develop a differential game model with an infinite time horizon to see what would happen if 
the manufacturer pays a part of the price of advertising for the retailer. Final results of this study 
show that cooperative program is implementable if the level of initial brand image is small or if 
the level of the initial brand image is intermediate and promotion is not too damaging to the brand 
image in certain cases. This paper doesn’t stress on the shelf space aspect of our interest but 
focuses mostly on promotional effects using game theory which adds dimension to our array of 
knowledge. Chen et al (2004)[39]  refer to a horizontal market with multiple newsvendors who 
face stochastic price-dependent demand. They make their pricing decisions and use this value to 
compete for the demand in that category. Here they use a linear and logit demand models with 
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substitutions among firms demand to prove the existence of NE and uniqueness of the solution by 
making he game super modular and showing that the best response function is a contraction 
respectively. Herr´an and Taboubi (2005) [94]and Herr´an et al. (2005) [95] examined the issue 
of shelf-space allocation in a dynamic game setting for a channel composed of two manufacturers 
and an exclusive retailer. In Herr´an and Taboubi (2005) [94] , the information structure is 
Markovian and the manufacturers are assumed to act myopically, while in Herr´an et al. (2005) 
[95], shelf-space and advertising decisions are time-dependent and the hypothesis of myopia is 
removed. In Herr´an and Taboubi (2005)[94] and Herr´an et al. (2005) [95]the authors assume 
that the retail and wholesale prices are constant. Borger and Dender (2006) [96] in their recent 
article study a duopolistic interaction between congestible facilities that supply perfect substitutes 
and make sequential decision on capacities and prices and compare the results to monopoly and 
first best out comes. The results of this study were there is more congestion at NE in duopoly 
compared to social optimum which is similar to monopoly situation. The higher congestion levels 
in duopoly are dies to strategic pricing responses to capacity investments. Also higher marginal 
costs increase profits in duopoly and lastly when capacity is cheap or demand inelastic stable 
asymmetric NE may result where the high capacity facility offers low time costs at high price and 
the smaller facility offers lower service levels at lower price.  
 
Most of the papers in marketing science literature look at the shelf space allocation problem as a 
potential source of conflict between the retailers and manufacturers.  Subsequently, Herr’an et al. 
(2006) [6] in their article examine shelf space allocation and pricing decisions in a market 
channel as a result of static game played as a Stackelberg between two manufacturers of 
competing brands and a retailer. The main results of this study are: (1) Lower the unit cost or 
greater the price elasticity the greater the shelf space allocated to that brand. (2) The higher the 
shelf space elasticity the lower are the wholesale prices and profits of all the members in the 
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supply chain.  This paper forms the basis to our research and serves as a benchmark to the 
empirical results and analytical results obtained further in the dissertation.  
 
3.3 Limitations of Previous Literature 
 
Although, there have been many interesting studies in the area of demand estimation, there still 
exist some drawbacks with each of the categories examined in the literature review section3.2. 
Some of drawbacks are listed below: 
 
 DOE: expensive models due to replication, complication in setting up experiments, 
difficulties associated with data collection and the lack of generalized conclusions for a 
group or class 
 Mathematical Models: Often complicated to interpret and implement. Most of them used 
profits maximization at a retailer only for estimating optimal demand. Cannot examine 
competition.  
 Software programs: The drawback of such computer programs or systems arises from 
their incompetence to capture the demand effects. Demand is a RV and highly stochastic 
in nature. Most of the commercial software discussed above are programmed based on 
heuristics and hence cannot accommodate the rapid change in demand that occurs due to 
stochasticity and competition.  
 Artificial Intelligence: Drawback with such kind of models is that none of them really 
address the issue from the marketing channel point of view. They either look at the 
retailers or manufacturers profit functions but not both for making decisions. These are 
 82  
mostly classical statistical methods as well. The models developed till date cannot 
address competition.  
 General Limitation:  Most of the models discussed in section 3.2 fail to include explicitly 
other subjective variables such as retailer to retailer competition and impact of 
manufacturers response that greatly influence future demand predictions.  
 
3.4 Problem statement and Objectives 
 
In this chapter the problem of demand estimation at the retailers also termed as microscopic 
demand estimation is addressed. The micro demand model estimates demand at a retailer level 
considering the effect of shelf-space allocated for each of the substitutable products, the price 
competition among these substitutable products at the retailer, and the pricing competition for 
these products at competing retailer locations. Therefore the main objective of this study is to 





Accurate demand estimation is an important aspect of integrated supply chain that is used to 
avoid bull whip effect, reduce excess holding of inventory and stock outs.  There has been ample 
research conducted in this area of demand estimation and inventory models as seen in section 3.2. 
All this research provides us with valuable tools and interesting demand models. In this chapter, a 
 83  
refined demand model that alleviates most of the limitations addressed in Section 3.3 of the 
existing demand models is presented. The current micro level demand model accounts for  
 
 Competition among Manufacturers: A manufacturer influences a product’s demand 
through his/her wholesale price that determines the product margins. In many of the 
shelf-space-optimization models, (as well as the user-friendly commercial tools) the 
amount of shelf-space allocated for a product depends on the product margins, which 
significantly affect the relative profitability achievable for a set of competing products. 
Since the amount of shelf-space allocated has a significant effect on the product’s 
demand, a manufacturer can influence a product’s demand through his/her wholesale 
price. Consequently, competition for different manufacturer’s products is achieved at the 
retailer level by the amount of shelf-spce allocated at the retailer level that is in turn 
dictated by the manufacturer’s wholesale prices [6]. 
 
 Competition among retailers: As stated by Gruen (2002) [63] 31% of the customers go to 
another store to get certain product when they don’t find it in the current store. This 
statement explicitly notifies us of the inherent competition among retailers. Besides 
unavailability of the product at a certain store, factors like price difference can also be 
considered possible reasons for competition among retailers. Empirical studies suggest 
that different retailers can charge different prices for the same product and the 
substitutes[97]. This difference in prices is termed as price discrimination. There is a vast 
literature in economics on the theory of price discrimination (see, for example, Varian 
1989 [98]for a review of this literature). In addition, a number of important papers in 
marketing (e.g., Moorthy 1984[99], Narasimhan 1984 [100]) have discussed different 
forms of price discrimination and how they might be implemented in practice. Due to 
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price discrimination at retailers as well as manufacturers, there exists competition among 
different retailers selling same products (e.g. Nike at Foot Locker vs. Nike at Big 5) and 
substitutes at different prices (e.g. Nike and Reebok running shoes).  
 
To better understand the competition among multiple retailers/manufacturers, it is necessary to 
understand economics concerning markets and pricing. When retailers/ manufacturers sell a 
product they face a demand/supply curve under which customers are willing to purchase a certain 
quantity that is dependent upon the price. Depending on the model of the market, the supply chain 
members either produce a specific quantity or set a specific price. The supply chain members 
make these choices dependent on possible outcomes of what they expect their competitors to do 
[101]. In strategic decision making situations, a supply chain member chooses his strategies such 
that he will maximize his returns, given the strategic choices of other supply chain members. The 
idea of the micro model discussed earlier is to incorporate these options encountered and 
interactions among the supply chain members into a formal demand estimation model. This is 
done in order to obtain optimal demand for retailers when costs and benefits of each option 
depend on the choices of competing retailers and manufacturers. The best tool to use such 
strategic decision making situations is Game theory.  
 
Game theory studies decisions made in environments in which supply chain members interact. 
The situations in which game theory has been applied in reality reveal its selective usefulness for 
the problems and solutions of distinctive and competitive nature. The two significant areas of 
application of this viable tool have been economics and war. The current micro model can be 
categorized as economic model and the members of this supply chain can be reckoned as real 
oligopolies. The term oligopoly denotes a situation where there are few sellers for a product or 
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service. The members of an oligopoly change the nature of a free market.  While they can't dictate 
price and availability like a monopoly can, they often turn into friendly competitors, since it is 
in all the members' interest to maintain a stable market and profitable prices [102]. 
In order to develop an understanding of the workings of real oligopolies a simple demand model 
that accounts for competition among manufacturers is considered first. Later, this model is 
augmented to account for competition among retailers. These two scenarios are described below: 
  
 Scenario 1: This scenario is an extension of an already built demand estimation model 
from Herr’ an et al (2006). It consists of two competing manufacturers of homogenous 
substitutable products battling for shelf space at a single retailer based on their pricing 
decisions. This scenario models competition among the manufacturers through their 
substitutable products.  
 
 Scenario 2: This scenario extends the demand model formulation of Scenario 1 to 
incorporate competition among the retailers while retaining the competition among the 
manufacturers. This scenario considers two competing retailer in addition to two existing 
competing manufacturers. As in Scenario 1, the manufacturers compete with one another 
through their substitutable products while the retailers compete through their pricing 
strategies.  
Figure 8 is a pictorial representation of this microscopic demand estimation model clearly 
explaining the two scenarios, sub-scenarios, methodology adopted and finally the variables that 
impact the whole process. In the next section, a brief description of game theoretic concepts is 
presented.  




Figure 8: Pictorial representation of micro-level demand estimation model. 
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3.6 Important definitions 
  
A two firm oligopoly is examined below in order to demonstrate game theoretic concepts such as 
Cournot, Stackelberg games, Nash equilibriums and sub-game perfect equilibra  [101] 
 
Definition 1: A Nash equilibrium (for two players) is a pair of strategies (S1*, S2*) such that  
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where Σ1 and Σ2 define the strategy spaces, π1 and π2 define the payoffs of the two players as a 
function of chosen strategies. In other words, given the strategy adopted by the other player 
neither player could do strictly better (i.e. increase their payoff) by adopting another strategy. It is 
clear from definition 1 that a Nash equilibrium never includes strictly dominated strategies, but it 
may include weakly dominated strategies.  
When a player tries to choose the "best" strategy among a multitude of options, that player may 
compare two strategies A and B to see which one is better. The result of the comparison is one of: 
 B dominates A: choosing B always gives at least as good an outcome as choosing A. 
There are 2 possibilities:  
o B strictly dominates A: choosing B always gives a better outcome than choosing 
A, no matter what the other player(s) do. 
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o B weakly dominates A: There is at least one set of opponents' action for which B 
is superior, and all other sets of opponents' actions give B at least the same 
payoff as A. 
 B and A are intransitive: B neither dominates, nor is dominated by, A. Choosing A is 
better in some cases, while choosing B is better in other cases, depending on exactly how 
the opponent chooses to play. For example, B is "throw rock" while A is "throw scissors" 
in Rock, Paper, Scissors. 
 B is dominated by A: choosing B never gives a better outcome than choosing A, no 
matter what the other player(s) do. There are 2 possibilities:  
o B is weakly dominated by A: There is at least one set of opponents' actions for 
which B gives a worse outcome than A, while all other sets of opponents' actions 
give A at least the same payoff as B. (Strategy A weakly dominates B). 
o B is strictly dominated by A: choosing B always gives a worse outcome than 
choosing A, no matter what the other player(s) do. (Strategy A strictly dominates 
B). 
This notion can be generalized beyond the comparison of two strategies. 
 Strategy B is strictly dominant if strategy B strictly dominates every other possible 
strategy. 
 Strategy B is weakly dominant if strategy B dominates all other strategies, but some are 
only weakly dominated. 
 Strategy B is strictly dominated if some other strategy exists that strictly dominates B. 
 Strategy B is weakly dominated if some other strategy exists that weakly dominates B. 
Mathematical definition weakly and strictly dominated strategies is as follows: 
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In mathematical terms, for any player ‘i’ , a strategy 
iSs ∈
* weakly dominates another strategy 
iSs ∈
'  if:  )],(),([ '* iiiiii ssussuSs −−−− ≥∈∀  (With at least one strict inequality) 
Remember that iS−  represents the product of all strategy sets other than i’s 
On the other hand s* strictly dominates s’ if: )],(),([ '* iiiiii ssussuSs −−−− >∈∀  
Definition 2: A strategy for player 1, 1Ŝ  is a best response to some (fixed) strategy for player 2, 
















Therefore, an equivalent form of the definition of a Nash equilibrium which focuses on the 
strategies rather than the payoffs, is that *1S  is a best response to 
*
2S  and vice versa. [103] 
 
Definition 3: A pair of strategies ( *1S ,
*




















It is clear that strictly dominated strategy is never a best response to any strategy, whereas weakly 
dominated strategy may be a best response to some strategy. This is why weakly dominated 
strategies may appear in Nash equilibra but strictly dominated strategies do not. To use this 
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definition to find Nash equilibra we find for each player, the set of best responses to every 
possible strategy of the other player. We then look for pairs of strategies that are best responses to 
each other.  
 
The extension of the theory of games with more than two players is straight forward. Let us label 
the players by }n,....,2,1{i∈ . Each player has a set of pure strategies iS  and a corresponding set 
of mixed strategies i∑ . The payoff to player ‘i’ depends on a list of strategies n21 S,........,S,S -one 
for each layer. For the definition of a Nash equilibrium we will need to separate out the strategy 
for each of the players, so we denote by iS−  the list of strategies used by all the players except the 
i
th  player.  
 

















π   [103] 
 
Definition 5:   In game theory, a sub-game perfect equilibrium is a refinement of a Nash 
equilibrium used in dynamic games. A strategy profile is a sub-game perfect equilibrium if it 
represents equilibrium of every sub-game of the original game. More informally this means that if 
(1) the players played any smaller game that consisted of only one part of the larger game and (2) 
their behavior represents a Nash equilibrium of that smaller game, then their behavior is a sub-
game perfect equilibrium of the larger game.  A common method for determining sub-game 
perfect equilibrium is backward induction.  
 
Definition 6:: A static game is one in which a single decision is made by each player and each 
player has no knowledge of the decisions made by the other players before making their own 
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decisions. Sometimes such games are referred to as simultaneous decision games because any 
actual order in which the decisions are made is irrelevant. [103] 
 
Definition 7: Cournot competition is an economic model used to describe industry structure. It 
has the following features:  
 
 There is more than one firm and all firms produce homogenous products 
 Firms do not cooperate 
 Firms have the market power 
 The number of firms is fixed 
 Firms compete in quantities and choose quantities simultaneously 
 There is strategic behavior by the firms 
 
An essential assumption of this model is that each firm aims to maximize profits based on the 
expectation that its own output decision will not have an effect on the decisions of its rivals. Price 
is commonly a known decreasing function of the total output. Each firm has a cost function 
)Q(C ii . Normally the cost functions are treated as common knowledge. The cost functions may 
be the same or different among firms. The market price is set at a level such that demand equals 
the total quantity produced by both firms. Each firm takes the quantity set by its competitors as 
given, evaluates its residual demand and then behaves as a monopoly. [104] 
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Example for Cournot Game and Nash Equilibrium 
 
Let the demand faced by firms be characterized by demand-price curve )p(QD , in which DQ is 
the quantity demanded of the firms at a set price p. For simplicity’s sake, let the demand is a 
linear function of the price:  
 
bpa)p(QD −=  
 
Firms face costs of production of two forms, fixed and variable. For this example let the fixed 
cost be zero and the  marginal cost be a constant value c. This assumption means that costs are 
linear in sq  that quantity supplied. So, the cost function is of the form:  
 
scq)q(C =  
 
As per this example, there exist two firms competing and their strategy is based on quantity rather 
than price. The two firms set their production quantities 21 qandq . Because these are two 
suppliers in the market , the market price is a function of the sum of the two firms production , 
( )21 qq + , which is the total production in the market. As with the previous case, a linear demand 
curve and a constant marginal cost of production is employed. The outcome from this strategy 
decision is the firms profit, which is a function of the market price, the quantity sold and the 
marginal cost:  
 
( ) ( ) c*qqqP*qq 12111 −+=π  
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The above equation simply states that a firms profit is always equal to the quantity sold times the 
price at which it is sold minus, the costs associated with production. By substituting the inverse 















 +−=π  
 
Any firm chooses its quantity of production so as to maximize its own profits indicating that 
firms profit is dependent on its own production quantity and competitors production quantity as 
well. The profit maximizing quantity is found by setting the derivative of the profit function for 



































Above two equations for the quantities are known as reaction curves or best response functions. 
They predict what quantity each firm would produce, given the quantity that the other firm is 
producing. Solving these two equations presents the optimal values of each quantity to be:  









The quantities found in the above equation are substituted into the original profit function, to 
calculate the profits of each firm as shown: 
 
( ) ( )211 cba
9
1
q −=π  
 
Since the firms are assumed to be identical, their strategies are also identical. Because there is 
perfect information, both firms know the other firms strategy. By solving the two reaction curves 
simultaneously, the equilibrium levels of production known as the Cournot equilibrium are 
presented. It is interesting to note that the Cournot equilibrium is in between the monopoly levels 
of production and the competitive levels. In addition, the profits earned by the two firms are less 
than half the monopoly profits.[101]. 
 
Implications of Cournot Games[104] 
 
 Output is greater with Cournot duopoly than monopoly, but lower than perfect 
competition. 
 Price is lower with Cournot games than monopoly but not as low as with perfect 
competition. 
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Definition 8: Stackelberg leadership model is a strategic game in which the leader firm moves 
first and then the follower firms move sequentially. Firms can engage in Stackelberg competition 
if one has some sort of advantage enabling it to move first. Moving observably first is the most 
obvious means of commitment: once the leader has made its move, he cannot undo the action. 
Moving first  may be possible if the leader is an incumbent monopoly of the industry and the 
follower is a new entrant. Holding excess capacity is another means of commitment.  [105] 
 
Example for Dynamic Multi-firm Competition 
 
The model is essentially identical to Cournot model except that it is a dynamic game. This means 
that there is a sequence to the course of events in the decision making process. Rather than both 
firms setting quantities at the same time, one firm is able to set a quantity first. For both firms the 
profit function looks identical to the one in Cournot example. However rather than maximizing 
profit with firm 2’s quantity as an unknown, firm 1 uses its knowledge of Firm 2’s reaction curve 
to gain further profits. Firm 1’s function now is solely a function of 1q : 
 












 +−=  
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Again, maximizing profits over quantity. Firm 1 produces a Stackelberg equilibrium quantity and 
Firm 2 produces a quantity that maximizes its profits given firm 1’s quantity as defined by its 
reaction curves. To find Firm 1’s production, the derivative of its profit function with respect to 

























Firm 2 has no option but to react to Firm 1’s production level in a way that maximizes its profits. 
From the original Cournot model, it is common knowledge that this strategy is determined by 
Firm 2’s reaction curve. Subtracting the value for 1q  given by the above equation , value for 2q  








Thus, by having the first mover or the leader advantage, Firm 1 captures more of the market 
share. In addition increasing its own profits as well. [101] 
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Stackelberg Vs Cournot Games [104] 
 
 Cournot and Stackelberg games compete on quantity and hence have similar models. T 
 Stackelberg leader has a crucial advantages as he moves first.  
 Perfect information sharing is an important assumption in Stackelberg game. This means 
that the follower must observe the quantity chosen by the leader else the game reduces to 
Cournot.  
 Stackelberg can also be a classical example of too much information hurting a player 
(follower) most of the times since these are sequential games 
 Simultaneous Cournot games prove to advantageous to all the players.  
 
3.7 Scenario 1 
 
This scenario defines competition among manufacturers through availability of homogeneous 
substitutable products at a retailer. The demand model for this scenario depicts the competition 
between manufacturers by using cross space and price elasticities.  
 
Figure (9) below is a pictorial representation of this scenario 1 describing the two competing 
manufacturers scenario along with the factors the factors that influence demand and the results of 
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Figure 9: Pictorial representation of Scenario1 for this micro level model where competition among 
manufacturers is considered.  
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3.8 Scenario 1 Model Formulation 
 
It is assumed in here that the prices of substitutable products are different and the shelf space is 
normalized to 1. Let S1 denote the shelf space allocated to manufacturer 1 and S2 the shelf space 







iS    
 
It is also assumed that there are no trade promotions, which means that the cost for shelf space is 
constant. This is clearly a simplifying assumption for product categories and brands where the 
manufacturers have to pay retailers to gain access to their shelf space.  
 
At the retailer level, the demand Qk for a product k is influenced by: 1) the elasticity (γk) of shelf-
space (Sk) allocated for that product, 2) the cross-elasticity (γl) of shelf-space (Sl) allocated for 
substitutional products, 3) the price elasticity (µk) of the product with price (Pk), and 4) the cross 
price elasticity (εk) of the substitutable (competing) product with price (Pl) [12, 77, 106].  
 
In economics and business studies, the price elasticity of demand (PED) is an “elasticity that 
measures the nature and degree of the relationship between changes in quantity demanded of a 
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k *−=µ  
 
By integrating this equation, you will get the power law form given by: 
 
kPQ
µ−∝        (3a) 
 
The cross price elasticity is defined as “the measure of responsiveness of the quantity demand of 
a good to a change in the price of a competing substitutable product from another manufacturer”.  




































ε∝        (3b) 
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Similarly, the elasticity (γk) of shelf-space (Sk) is defined as: “elasticity that measures the nature 
and degree of the relationship between changes in quantity demanded of a good to changes in the 
amount of shelf space allocated to that product”. By definition, direct shelf space elasticity (γk) of 
































By integrating this equation, you will get the power law form given by: 
 
. kkk SQ
γ∝        (3c) 
 
The cross shelf space elasticity is defined as “the measure of responsiveness of the quantity 
demand of a good to a change in the shelf space allocated to a competing substitutable product 



















Using differential calculus: 

















γ∝        (3d) 
 




εµ−γγα= ****    for k, l =1,2     (3.1) 
where 10,0,0,0 <<≥≥> γεµα kk . 
The demand function in (3.1) also known as Cobb-Douglas equation in economics literature. The 
power law formulation of the demand model accounts for the interaction between the variables 
and also has the property that elasticities are constant. Unlike the models proposed by Zufreyden 
(1986)[78]and Herr’an et al (2006)[6], our demand/supply/sales function specifically includes the 
cross-shelf-space elasticities between products within the same product  category.   
It should be noted that: 
 
 0Qk ≥ : The proof of this is simple and intuitive. There cannot be negative 
amounts of any product supplied or demanded. Therefore the quantity of sales >0 
which is strictly positive.  
 









Proof 1: Using equation (3.1) the first order derivative with respect to shelf space allocated to 













The above equation is not negative because, all the prices involved are positive and also shelf 
space allocation cannot be negative, the shelf space direct elasticity value is also observed to 











Proof 2:  A first order derivative of quantity is taken with same restrictions on shelf space 
and prices as proof 1. The resulting derivative is a demand function multiplied by cross space 
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Proof 3:  Again a first order partial derivative on quantity demanded with similar restrictions 
as proof1 on shelf space and price is applied. The resulting derivative is multiplied by direct 
shelf space elasticity that carries a negative sign. Therefore the whole derivative is negative 







0)( 1 ≤µ−α= ε−µ−γγ kklk lklkk PPSS  
 
The above proofs indicate that sales of brand k are nonnegative, increase with the shelf space 
allocated to that brand and with the competing brand’s retail price, and decrease with its own 
retail price and competing brand’s shelf space. The inequality µk ≥  εk reflects the accepted 
assumption in economics, stating that own-price elasticity is higher in absolute value than cross-
price elasticity. This assumption is made in oligopoly models [6] and it has also been empirically 
validated in the context of price promotions models [107].  
 
REMARK 1: Although the direct and cross shelf-space elasticities are defined earlier as 
two independent quantities, the normalization constraint on the shelf-space imposes a 



















      (3.2) 
 
Since S1 + S2 = 1,  
 





































































































































































Simple algebraic manipulations applied to (3.6) would yield the result indicated below: 
 



































































Thus, cross-elasticity is proportional to shelf-space ratio, with the proportionality factor 
being minus the direct elasticity.  
 
3.9 Scenario 1: Stackelberg Game 
 
In the two manufacturer competition scenario, the optimal demand/supply values are obtained by 
maximizing each player’s profit functions (Cournot game). Additionally, in a Stackelberg game 
scenario, manufacturers become leaders and the retailer is the follower. The optimal demand 
values in a Stackelberg equilibrium are obtained by following the two-step procedure outlined 
below: 
 First, optimize the follower’s (retailer) profit equation to get her reaction functions 
(i.e., shelf space allocation and sale price) for a given leaders’ strategies (wholesale 
prices). The leaders strategies are given by their responses to a Cournot game 
scenario.  
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 Next, these reaction functions are inserted into the manufacturers’ objectives and 
Nash equilibrium is calculated.  
 
This is best illustrated in the two manufacturers scenario in which manufacturers compete for 
shelf-space allocation at a given retailer. The retailer’s optimization problem is given by:  
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µ−γγα−=Π *****)(      (3.11) 
 
3.9.1 Retailers Response Functions  
 
The following proposition characterizes the retailers reaction functions for shelf space allocation 
and sales prices at the equilibrium which are obtained by solving the first order optimality 
conditions for the retailers profit maximization.   























(a) Assuming there is an interior solution, the retailer’s reaction function for the shelf space 



















= SAS        (3.12) 
 


















= SAS        (3.13) 
 
(b) The retailers sales prices for both the products at the equilibrium are give as follows: 
 





γ−γγ−γε−µ−−ε−µ− −ε−=+µ− SSPWPPWP      








γ−γγ−γε−µ−−ε−µ− −ε−=+µ− SSPWPPWP      
          (3.15) 
 
On substituting the optimal values of shelf space from equations (3.12) and (3.13) in equations 
(3.14) and (3.15) a more complex equation for the sales prices is obtained. Therefore numerical 
analysis is opted for in this situation. 
 
Proof 4: Assuming interior solution, first order optimality condition for retailer’s maximization 
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          (3.19) 
 
Solving (3.16 and 3.17) subject to the shelf-space normalization constraint results in optimal 
shelf-space allocation expressions presented in (3.12 and 3.13). However, given the functional 
forms of the retail prices in equations (3.14 and 3.15), an analytical solution for the optimal price 
values at Stackelberg equilibrium is cumbersome. Therefore, Newton Raphson’s method is 
employed to numerically evaluate the optimal values at equilibrium.  
 
Item (a) in Proposition 1 indicates that the shelf space allocated to brand 1, and similarly to brand 
2, is a function of all the model’s parameters (direct- and cross price elasticities and shelf-space 
elasticity). It also depends on wholesale prices set by the manufacturers as well as the retail prices 
for both the products. In retailer shelf-space-optimization models, the wholesale prices are 
assumed to be exogenous. But at Nash equilibrium the optimal wholesale prices are obtained. 
Here, the wholesale price can be interpreted as a mechanism used by a manufacturer to obtain the 
desirable share of the shelf.  
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Notice also that these reaction functions satisfy 0 < *2
*
1 ,SS < 1, for all parameters and wholesale 
price values. Hence the solution is indeed interior. The shelf space allocated to each brand is 
decreasing in its wholesale price and increasing in the competitive brand’s wholesale price. 
Indeed, the partial derivatives of *2
*






















































































    (3.21) 
 
Similarly, the retail prices are also increasing in the competitive brands wholesale prices and 
decreasing in their own prices. The partial derivatives of the optimal retail prices with respect to 







































  (3.22) 
 














































  (3.23) 
 
Item (b) in Proposition 1 indicates that the sale price set by the retailer is non-linear and depends 
on the direct- and cross-price elasticities of sales and shelf space allocated along with the sale 
price of the substitutable product and its own wholesale price. The sale price of a product 
increases when the price elasticity for the brand decreases and when its cross-price elasticity 
increases. This result is intuitive because it confirms that the retailer will increase their sale price 
or retail margin for those brands whose sales are less sensitive to a variation in their own price, 
but also when the brand’s sales are very sensitive to the price variations of the competing brand. 
Although the final equilibrium expression of the shelf space allocated by the retailer to each 
brand will be obtained after computing the retail and whole sale prices, we can nevertheless 
characterize the ratio of shelf space. 







The equilibrium ratio of brands respective shelf space is given as the ratio of revenues generated 






















      (3.24) 
 
























=     (3.25) 
 


























     (3.26) 
 
Therefore, proposition 2 provides us with an optimal allocation rule that articulates, the brands’ 
relative shares of the shelf space must be equal to their substitutable profits.  
3.9.2 Manufacturers Response Functions 
 
The manufacturers take into account the retailer’s reaction functions and play a Nash 
(Stackelberg) game. Therefore, both manufacturers’ wholesale prices at equilibrium are obtained 
by replacing the retailer’s reaction functions into their profit functions and maximizing them. 
That is, manufacturer ‘k’ fixes his wholesale price by maximizing his objective function or profit 
function with respect to the whole sale price subject to retailer’s reaction functions of shelf space 








µ−γγα−=Π *****)(  
 
Since a closed form structure is not available for the retail prices, these values are not substituted 
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in the manufacturer’s profit function. The derivatives of the profit function are solved numerically 
using Newton Raphson’s method to obtain optimal demand/supply values. Proposition 3 given 
below characterizes the manufacturers equilibrium wholesale prices that act as tools through 













































































          (3.27) 
lKandlK ≠=<γ<<γ< 2,1,;10;10 21  
 
Proof 5: Assuming interior solution, the first order optimality condition for each of the 
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Unfortunately the system of equations identified for the retailer in Section 3.9.1 do not have a 
closed form solution. Consequently, closed-form analytical solutions for optimal values of 
wholesale prices are unattainable. Therefore, Newton Raphson’s method is employed to evaluate 
optimal values.  
3.9.3 Importance of propositions 
 
 Proposition 1: answers the question regarding the impact of manufacturer’s decision 
in pricing and shelf-space allocation. 
 Proposition 2: provides allocation ratio based on revenues made.  
 Proposition 3: summarizes results for the case where both manufacturers are active 
players. Provides the manufacturers with tools through which they can intervene in 
the decision making process.  
3.10 Case Study/Numerical Analysis 
 
A generalized analytical equilibrium solution for the optimal demand could not be obtained due 
to the open loop structure of the retail prices. Therefore numerical evaluation techniques such as 
Newton Raphson’s method are employed to gain insights into the optimal behavior of retailers 
and manufacturers under different strategies. Initial starting values and fixed values for 
elasticities in order to start the simulation for obtaining optimal shelf space and prices are taken 
from Herr’ an et al (2006) [6] and are tabulated in table 11. The simulation was run in R-software. 
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The maximum number of iterations to reach convergence for this method was set to 10,000. The 
optimal values are reported in the results section 3.11.  
3.11 Scenario 1 : Results & Discussion 
 
This section presents the results when the supply chain members interact with each other through 
the combination of options they choose. The results are believed to be best for the equilibrium 
strategies and deviation from these strategies indicates deviation from equilibrium which would 
prove to be non-beneficial to any of the supply chain members. Tabulated below are the results 
for this scenario. 
 
Table 11 depicts the initial values used for starting the Newton Raphson’s method in R-software. 
The values as indicated are adopted from Herr’ an et al (2006) [6] 
 
Table 12 shows us that lower the retail price more is the shelf space allocated, this result is 
similar to Herr’ an et al (2006)[6] for scenario 1.  
 
Table 13 provides optimal wholesale prices through which the manufacturers can intervene into 
the decision making process. The manufacturer with lower wholesale prices gets more shelf space 
since that is translated into lower retail price. Hence this is a clear indication that demand is more 
or less price driven. 
 
Results shown in table 14 indicate prices and profits for leaders are more than those for followers. 
Lower the prices, higher the shelf space allocated to the products. Therefore the manufacturers 
can actually compete with each other in order to provide the retailers with lowest price for 
 118 
substitutable products thereby attracting more shelf space for their product. This way, the 
manufacturers can influence the shelf space allocation strategies at the retailers.  
 
Table 15 numerically validates the proofs 1 to 5. This table clearly proves that demand increases 
with the price of the substitutable items whereas demand decreases with its own price. Similarly, 
shelf-space increases with decreasing prices and vice versa.  
 
Table 11: Initial values taken for obtaining optimal values of retailer 
 
Table 12: Optimal Values for the retailer playing a Cournot game.  
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Table 13: Optimal value for manufacturers at Cournot Equilibrium.  
 
Table 14: Optimal values for all the marketing channel members at Stackelberg Equilibrium. 
 
Table 15: Numerical Analysis results of the proofs 
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3.12 Scenario 2 
  
This scenario extends the demand model formulation of scenario 1 to incorporate competition 
among the retailers while retaining the manufacturers competition. This scenario considers two 
competing retailer as well as two competing manufacturers. As in Scenario 1, the manufacturers 
compete with one another through their substitutable products, which influences the shelf-space 
allocation at each of the retailers. The shelf-space allocation in turn influences the demand for 
each of the products. In addition, the retailers compete with one another through their pricing 
strategies for each of the substitutable products.  
 
Figure (10) is a diagrammatic representation of two competing manufacturers and two competing 
retailers scenario. In particular, the figure shows: 
 
 Examples of two competing manufacturers such as Nike and Reebok shoe companies  
 Examples of two competing retailers selling the goods from competing manufacturers 
such as Big 5 and Foot Locker.   
 Breakdown structure of this scenario into five sub-scenarios because of various gaming 
strategies followed by the supply chain partners  
 Factors effecting this scenario such as pricing, shelf space and competition among 
various levels of supply chain.  




Figure 10: Represents Scenario II where competition among retailers is considered along with competing 
manufacturers.  
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3.13 Scenario 2 Model Formulation 
 
In this section a retail shelf space allocation model for a competitive distribution channel is 
proposed. This model is examined to see if competitive pricing decisions are profitable for such 
channels. While previous studies indicated that coop programs increase the total channel profits 
there has been no evidence incase of bilateral monopolies. In this section the demand model 
presented consists of two competing retailers and two competing manufacturers. In particular, this 
model acounts for brand (competing manufacturers) and store (competing retailers) substitution 
effects generated by the shelf space and pricing strategies while playing Cournot, Stackelberg and 
Mixed games.  
 
Each player maximizes her own profit. Since there are two retailer’s, their objective function is 
given by:  
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          (3.37) 
The full demand model described in this scenario accounts for substitution effects and is of 
interest to mass distribution industries where substitutable products/brands are sold in competing 
stores. However, this is not the most general model in the sense that a symmetry assumption has 
been made regarding substitution effects. Indeed its readily seen that :  
 
0Qk ≥ : The proof of this is very simple and intuitive. There cannot be negative amounts of 
































The above proofs indicate that sales of brand k are nonnegative, increasing in the shelf space 
allocated to that brand and in the competing brand’s retail price, and decreasing in its own retail 
price and competing brands shelf space. This is applicable to both the retailers and manufacturer 
goods. It is also believed that these assumptions are acceptable in the context of consumer 
products belonging to the same category and where the stores carrying them are of the same type. 
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Bergen and John (1997) [108] and Trivedi (1998) [109] deal with symmetric substitutability 
effect in competitive marketing channels. But one should note that the above assumptions do not 
imply symmetric elasticities.  
 
The game of pricing and shelf-space allocation for attaining optimal demand is played as a 
Cournot ,Stackelberg and Mixed in five stages. Scenario 2 is more complex compared to scenario 
1,  because there exists competition within and between retailers and manufacturers. In order to 
obtain optimal demand values, several types of games have to be played between members and 
among different levels of the supply chain. This leads us to the classification of scenario 2 into 
five sub-scenarios as follows: 
 
 Sub-scenario1: Cournot game played at both retailers and manufacturers level 
considering elasticities fixed values  
 
 Sub-scenario2: Retailers play a Stackelberg game considering the wholesale prices  are 
known.  
 
 Sub-scenario 3: Manufacturer1 plays a SG individually with both the competing retailers 
as followers. The optimal retail prices are obtained from sub-scenario 2. Cournot game is 
played within the manufacturers group. 
 
 Sub-scenario 4: Manufacturer2 plays SG individually with both the competing retailers as 
followers. The optimal retail prices are obtained from sub-scenario 2. Cournot game is 
played within the manufacturers group. 
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 Sub-scenario 5: Stackelberg played at both retailers and manufacturers to find optimal 
wholesale prices, the retail prices are obtained from sub-scenario 2.  
 
3.14 Scenario 2: Stackelberg Game  
 
In the two manufacturer two retailers competition scenario, the optimal demand/supply values are 
obtained by maximizing each player’s profit functions (Cournot game). Additionally, in a 
Stackelberg game scenario, manufacturers become leaders and the retailers are the followers. The 
optimal demand values in a Stackelberg equilibrium are obtained by following the two-step 
procedure outlined below: 
 First, optimize the follower’s (retailer) profit equation to get her reaction functions 
(i.e., shelf space allocation and sale price) for a given leaders’ strategies (wholesale 
prices). The leaders strategies are given by their responses to a Cournot game 
scenario.  
 Next, these reaction functions are inserted into the manufacturers’ objectives and 
Nash equilibrium is calculated.  
 
This is best illustrated in the two manufacturers two retailers scenario in which manufacturers 
compete for shelf-space allocation at a given retailer while the retailers compete through their 




3.15 Retailers Response Functions 
 
The following proposition characterizes the competing retailers reaction  functions for shelf space 
allocation and retail prices at Nash equilibrium. The optimal prices and allocations are obtained 




(a) Assuming there is an interior solution, both the retailers reaction function for the shelf space 



























































  (3.39) 
 
 
 (b) The retailers sales prices for both the products at the equilibrium are give as follows: 
 

















εε   (3.40) 
 
 



















ε−ε   (3.41) 
 
 


















ε−ε  (3.42) 
 



















ε−ε   (3.43) 
 
Substituting the optimal values of shelf space from equations (3.38) and (3.39) into optimal retail 
prices would complicate the already complex equations for the four retail prices. Therefore a 
closed form analytical solution is not available.  
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Proof 6 : Assuming interior solution first order optimality condition for retailers maximization 
problem with respect to shelf space allocation as well as price is as follows: 
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ε−ε      (3.49)      
 
 
The analytical solutions presented in this section for retail prices are not closed form solutions. 
Hence a numerical optimization technique called Newton Raphon’s method is used to arrive at 
the optimal retail prices while trying to maximize retailers profit functions.  
 
Most of the literature on retailer demand optimization models assumes wholesale prices to be 
exogenous. But this chapter considers wholesale prices as a tools used by a manufacturer to 





1 ,SS < 1, for all parameters and wholesale price values. Hence the solution is indeed interior. 
The shelf space allocated to each brand is decreasing in its wholesale price and increasing in the 
competitive brand’s wholesale price. Below are the partial derivatives of the optimal prices and 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Item (ii) in Proposition 1 indicates that the sale price set by the retailer depend on the direct- and 
cross-price elasticities of sales and shelf space allocated along with the sale price of the 
substitutable product and its whole sale price. The sale price of a product increases when the price 
elasticity for the brand decreases and when its cross-price elasticity increases. This result is 
intuitive because it confirms that the retailer will increase their sale price or retail margin for 
those brands whose sales are less sensitive to a variation in their own price, but also when the 
brand’s sales are very sensitive to the price variations of the competing brand. Although the final 
equilibrium expression of the shelf space allocated by the retailer to each brand will be obtained 
after computing the retail and whole sale prices , we can nevertheless characterize the ratio of 
shelf space. 
 








The equilibrium ratio of brands respective shelf space is given as the ratio of revenues generated 

























































   (3.63) 
 
























    (3.64) 
 
Therefore, the allocation rule in equation (3.62) tells us that the brands’ relative shares of the 
shelf space must be equal to their own profits. This proposition provides us an answer for the 
equilibrium allocation rule. Proposition 1 as a whole answers our questions regarding the 
influence of manufacturers prices in the decision making processes. But the actual influence is 
observed only when a Stackelberg game played by manufacturers with retailers.   
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3.16 Manufacturers Response Functions 
 
The manufacturers take into account both the retailer’s reaction functions and play a Nash game. 
Therefore, both manufacturers’ wholesale prices at equilibrium are obtained by replacing the 
retailer’s reaction functions into their profit functions and maximizing them. The main 
assumption in this scenario is that each manufacturer offers a different price to each retailer. This 
means that the whole sale price for product 1 or 2 are not the same for both the retailers. There 
could be several reasons behind this price discrimination. Some of them could be the quantity 
ordered, relations maintained (personal communication with Wal-Mart) and visibility offered for 
certain products over others.   
 
Manufacturer ‘k’ fixes his wholesale price by maximizing his objective function or profit function 
with respect to the whole sale prices subject to retailers optimal of shelf space allocations and 








µ−γεεα−=Π 1**)(  
 
The retail prices are not substituted in the profit function of the manufacturer above since there 
exists no closed form solutions for the retail prices. Next step is to evaluate the profit function of 
manufacturers at Cournot and Stackelberg equilibriums in order to obtain the optimal wholesale 
prices of their products. The next proposition summarizes results for the case where both 
manufacturers are active players and offer cooperation to the retailers as leaders. In such a 
scenario, the game is a two-stage sequential one. Nash equilibrium is determined recursively by 
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first obtaining both the retailers reaction functions and then determining the manufacturers 
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Proof 7: Assuming interior solution the first order optimality condition for each of the 
manufacturers profit maximization problem is given as follows: 
 
(i) Partial derivative of manufacturer 1 profit with respect to whole sale price offered to first 
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Similarly for Manufacturer 2 
 
(i) Partial derivative of manufacturers profit with respect to whole sale price offered to first 
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(ii) Partial derivative of manufacturers profit with respect to whole sale price offered to second 
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Due to the open loop structure of the retail prices and partial derivatives, numerical analysis is 
performed. The complexity of retail price substitution and simplification reduces our capability to 
derive the upper and lower bounds on the wholesale price of the manufacturer like [6]. Hence we 
are unable to comment on the concavity of the whole sale prices and sensitivity analysis of the 
lower and upper bounds.  
 
3.17 Case Study/Numerical Analysis 
 
Once the strategies to be played are laid out carefully for scenario 2 using all the sub-scenarios,  
generalized analytical equilibrium solution for the optimal demand could not be obtained due to 
the open loop structure of retail prices. Therefore numerical evaluation techniques such as 
Newton Raphson’s method are employed to gain insights into the optimal behavior of retailers 
and manufacturers under different strategies. Initial starting values and fixed values for 
elasticities in order to start the simulation for obtaining optimal shelf space and prices are taken 
from Herr’ an et al (2006) [6] and are tabulated in table 16. The simulation was run in R-software. 
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The maximum number of iterations to reach convergence for this method was set to 10,000. The 
optimal values are reported in the results section 3.18.  
  
3.18 Scenario 2: Results and Discussions 
 
This section presents the results when the supply chain members interact with each other through 
the combination of options they choose. The results are believed to be best for the equilibrium 
strategies and deviation from these strategies indicates deviation from equilibrium which would 
prove to be non-beneficial to most of the supply chain members. Tabulated below are the results 
for this scenario.  
 
Table 16 values are used to as fixed values for elasticities and cost prices. The wholesale prices 
are considered for evaluating retail prices in Cournot games. 
 
Table 17 depicts results of a pure Cournot game played among the retailers considering the 
wholesale prices as exogenous and given. The shelf space allocated reveal the similarity to 
scenario 1. Lower the price higher the shelf space allocated. These can be categorized as sub-
scenario 1 results or Cournot equilibrium results.  
 
Table 18 considers the values of retailers as exogenous (taken from table 17) and then calculates 
the values of the manufacturers while playing a pure Cournot game at both levels.  
 
Since there exist two competing retailers, one is considered the  leader like a veteran in that area 
and other is a follower who is a new entrant. The leader fixes the prices of his product first and 
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the follower observes and makes his moves. The results in table 19 are indicative of the leader-
follower relationship among retailers while considering the leaders prices from table 17 and 
wholesale prices from table 18. The follower values are then computed using the same routine of 
Newton Raphson’s method.  
 
Results of table 20 are obtained by playing different games at different levels of the supply chain. 
This strategy is called Mixed games. The retailers for this strategy have already play Stackelberg 
and their values are obtained from table 17. These retail prices are considered to be exogenous 
variables while optimizing the manufacturers profit function.  
 
Result shown in table 21 are indicative of Stackelberg game between all parties of the supply 
chain. The retail prices and manufacturer’s 1 prices are considered exogenous for obtaining 
optimal values for manufacturer 2. These exogenous values for retailers are taken from Table 19 
and for the Manufacturer 1 are chosen from Table 20.  
 
The profits/losses shown in table 22 indicate coop programs as non-beneficial. Though this result 
contradicts the literature, the rationale for such behavior is the uniqueness of the demand function 
followed in scenario 2, that considers competition among retailers. The demand model considers 
the retail price of one product from the competing retailer to influence the demand. On the other 
hand, the profits and prices for the Cournot are greater compared to Stackelberg and Mixed 
games. These results are consistent with the classical economic literature. Table 22 also presents 
us opportunities for future research as it indicates that there are some other factors that strongly 
influence the profits which are not considered.  
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Table 16: Fixed parameters for calculating the two retailers optimal values. 
 
 
Table 17: Optimal values for both the retailer in Cournot game 
 
 





















3.19 Conclusions  
 
This chapter examined the competition among supply-chain members and its influence on 
demand estimation models at a retailer using a game theoretic approach. A systematic analysis of 
Cournot and Stackelberg oligopolies with increasingly complex demand functions is conducted in 
order to obtain optimal demand values. These optimal demand values are translated into optimal 
shelf-space allocation rules and pricing decisions strategies for the various members of the supply 
chain. Interesting insights based on factors and strategies affecting allocation rules and profits 
were also revealed in this process. 
 
This game-theory approach to optimal demand estimation in the presence of competition allows 
us to make the following inferences:  
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 When a set of homogeneous substitutable products exist, manufacturers can influence a 
product’s demand through their control on wholesale prices, which effects the amount of 
shelf-space allocated at a retailer in turn influencing the product’s demand. Lower wholesale 
prices translate to lower retail prices, which in turn result in more shelf space allocated for 
that product and more demand.  
 
 The Stackelberg game played among the supply-chain members is very close to a real-world 
scenario, in which the leader represents a tycoon in that area and the follower represents a 
new entrant into the business.  
♦ The prices and profits of the leaders are in general more than those of the 
follower; 
♦ Similarly, the shelf-space allocated for the follower’s product  is typically less 
than that allocated for the leader’s product.  
 
 Prices and profits are less for sequential simultaneous Stackelberg games compared with 
those present in Cournot games for all the members of the supply chain. This is consistent 
with the established results in classical economic literature.  
 
 Coordination in terms of knowing the price of the leader might not be beneficial for 
improving profits. However,  it is crucial for reducing the bull-whip effect along the entire 
supply chain. 
 
 Overall, the analysis of various strategies applied across the two scenarios suggests the 
necessity to confirm the level and intensity of information-sharing among the members of an 
















Discussion of Findings 
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4.1 Contributions of this Research 
 
Demand planning is the coordination of the flow of dependent demand through companies in the 
supply chain. This integrated process is similar to traditional sales and operations planning 
processes that occur within firms that plan for the internal flow of products within a firm. 
However, demand planning integrates the processes across firms in the supply chain. In recent 
decades, increasing globalization, outsourcing, and developments in information technology have 
enabled many organizations, such as Dell and Hewlett Packard, to successfully operate solid 
collaborative supply networks in which each specialized business partner focused on only a few 
key strategic activities (Scott, 1993)[110]. However, it is not clear what kind of performance 
impacts these different supply network structures may have on businesses, and little is known 
about the coordination conditions and trade-offs that may exist among the players. From a system 
point of view, a complex network structure can be decomposed into individual component firms 
(Zhang and Dilts, 2004)[111]. Using Zhang and Dilts' (2004) [111] idea of decomposition, this 
project presents a hierarchical demand estimation model that is capable of predicting and 
estimating demand in the presence of 1) censored and exact demand data, 2) advertising 
expenditure data, 3) stochastic regional effects, 4) competition among the retailers and 
manufacturers, 5) shelf-space allocation to certain products and their substitutes, and 6) the 
pricing decisions of supply chain partners. Since the manufacturers and the retailers are at 
opposite ends of a supply chain, demand models developed for these two entities are different. 
Therefore, the entire dissertation is divided into macro-micro demand estimation strategies that 
estimate demand at both the manufacturer and retailer levels, respectively.  
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In general, my research has focused on how demand estimation models at different tiers of the 
supply chain influenced by disparate factors can predict future demand for a product. Most of the 
analysis conducted in this macro-micro estimation models focuses on the unique set of factors 
associated with each tier and the novelty of the methodologies used to predict demand.  Thus, this 
investigation consolidates and adds new perspectives to describe the theory of demand estimation 
at various levels of a supply chain. To the best of my knowledge, the association of these unique 
sets of factors with these respective methodologies has not been exploited. As such, this 
dissertation contributes to the understanding of demand estimation theory within the supply chain 
literature. My work explores multidisciplinary research involving analytical demand estimation 
models utilizing statistical and optimization techniques to demonstrate the potential of 
methodologies. These models can help managers to make critical decisions about inventory 
management, resource allocation, and other strategic activities that drive the profits of an 
organization. As a result my work is significant in its potential impact on both industry and 
academia, where demand estimation has been a very important issue for decades.   
 
Concepts and techniques dealing with demand estimation at different tiers of a supply chain have 
been researched extensively for the past two decades. However, none of these pieces of literature 
brought the perspective together into one study. Finally, this investigation brings together the 
manufacturers' perspective (the macro demand estimation model) and the retailers' perspective 
(micro demand estimation model) into one study. The macroscopic demand estimation model 
predicts future regional demand for a manufacturer in the presence of censored demand data, 
advertising expenditure data, and regional stochastic effects. Additionally, this model provides a 
theoretical understanding of the complexities of demand estimation in the presence of censored 
data using Bayesian MCMC techniques. The microscopic model, on the other hand, estimates 
demand in the presence of competition among retailers and manufacturers. This micro-model 
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utilizes game theory and optimization techniques in order to obtain information about optimal 
demand experienced by retailers.  
 
Summarized below are the specific contributions of each of these macro-micro models.  
 
• Macroscopic regional demand estimation model contributions: 
 
In this phase, a demand estimation model for estimating and predicting demand at the 
manufacturer is formulated. The contributions of this phase are as follows: 
 
 It proposes Bayesian MCMC methods for solving demand estimation problem at a 
single product manufacturer in the presence of past censored and exact demand data, 
demand distribution with unknown parameters, regional advertising expenditure, and 
regional stochastic effects. 
 It calculates the posterior demand percentile for using the familiar “Newsvendor 
Optimal Cost” model.  
 
Specifically, the contributions of this macro demand estimation model are that Bayesian MCMC 
method can be used to: 
 
 estimate and predict the nth percentile of demand for all the sampled regions and a 
random region selected from population. 
 compute the probability that the posterior demand at the nth percentile would be less 
than a certain amount when a given amount of money is spent on advertising. 
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 provide trace plots and an MC errors table that evaluate the convergence and 




• Microscopic local demand estimation model contributions: 
 
This micro-model estimates the optimal demand faced by the retailer in making optimal pricing 
and shelf-space allocation decisions. In particular, demand in the micro phase is evaluated in the 
presence of competition among retailers and manufacturers through their competing substitutable 
products, shelf-space allocation for respective products, and pricing decisions. The main 
contributions of this micro model are that it: 
 
 proposes game theory and optimization techniques to solve two demand estimation 
models in the presence of pricing decisions, shelf-space allocation- and competition. 
 utilizes Static Cournot, mixed, and sequential Stackelberg games to obtain optimal 
pricing and shelf-space allocation strategies.  
 
Specifically, the contributions of this micro demand estimation model are that game theory and 
optimization techniques can be used to: 
 
 Introduce competition among manufacturers serving a single retailer in Scenario 1.  
 Extend Scenario 1 to incorporate competition among the retailers while retaining the 
competition between the manufacturers; this is called Scenario 2. 
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 Obtain analytically optimal demand values at Nash equilibrium for both scenarios by 
playing static Cournot, mixed, and sequential Stackelberg games. 
 Employ Newton Raphson's method to obtain numerically optimal pricing and shelf-
space allocation values due to the open-form structure of the analytical solutions and 
also to evaluate the applicability of these models to industry.  
 Calculate profits across the supply chain for Cournot, Stackelberg and mixed game 
strategies for Scenario 2.    
 
 
Both these demand estimation models contribute significantly to the existing supply chain 
literature by providing a o360  view of looking at demand estimation, both from a retailer's and a 
manufacturer's point of view. This dissertation formulated and evaluated demand models at two 
tiers of supply chains using two unique solution strategies for different sets of influential factors. 
Numerical examples evaluated at each level successfully demonstrate the potential of the two 
methodologies discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. This perspective not only holds promise for 
opening up new avenues of scholarly inquiry into demand estimation and supply-chain 
management, but also offers guidance to managers who are searching for tools fitted for the task 
of increasing the profits of the entire supply chain and maintaining appropriate inventory levels in 




This research provides significant insights into several aspects of inter-firm integration and their 
impact on the entire supply chain's profits and performances. Relationships between demand 
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estimation and sets of influential factors at various levels of supply chain were investigated in 
order to improve the supply chain's ability to match demand with supply so as to reduce the "bull-
whip" effect, holding costs, and stock-out situations.  
 
Explicitly, this macro demand estimation phase provides a Bayesian MCMC methodology for 
obtaining optimal regional demand predictions and estimates. This is especially beneficial for 
manufacturers, as it enables them to: 
 
 Choose a minimum advertising budget such that a further increase in advertising budget 
would not necessarily increase the demand for that product. 
 Choose a minimum stock level in order to satisfy the end customers. 
 
Similarly, the micro demand estimation model is also a customer-focused model that attempts to 
balance the tradeoffs of competition and profits through optimal pricing and shelf-space 
allocation strategies. In particular, the micro demand estimation model at the retailer level reveals 
that 
 
 optimal pricing decisions and shelf-space allocation strategies offer greater opportunity to 
increase profits at the retail level. 
 of all the various strategies explored, static Cournot competition among the supply chain 
partners proved to be the most profitable scenario compared with the mixed or sequential 
Stackelberg games among the retailers and manufacturers.  
 Cournot competition allows for higher retail and wholesale prices compared with mixed 





Limiting the first phase of this dissertation to a single product and a single manufacturer served 
the research purpose by minimizing extraneous variation, thereby limiting the complexity of the 
numerical model. A more generic real-world scenario with many heterogeneous and homogenous 
groups of goods and multiple manufacturers would have been a better representation of factors 
and competition affecting demand. The mathematical and simulated models depended greatly on 
academic research and synthetic data. Although the numerical analysis was validated using 
accuracy and convergence models, it would be enlightening and beneficial to use external real-
time data in order to evaluate the authenticity and reliability of the proposed models accurately.  
 
4.4 Future directions for research 
 
Future studies that include multiple manufacturers, multiple retailers, and multiple products 
would provide the opportunity to explore the boundaries within which theoretical relationships 
hold. As a first step, it will be interesting to revisit the data sections in phases one and two with 
real-time data and to examine the optimal predictions, estimations, pricing decisions and shelf-
space allocations by using training and holdout samples. It will also be interesting to find settings 
that introduce multiple stochastic regional effects with different prior distributions from the 
Weibull demand model formulated in phase one. Another possible extension of this study would 
be to consider three-parameter Weibull, where the location parameter reflects other marketing 
mix variables such as competition, prices, etc.  
 
The second phase of this study purposely excluded the examination of the effects of trade 
promotions on the profits of the retailers and manufacturer in order to simplify the existing 
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supply-demand models. A possible extension of the second phase of this study could be to 
explore the multi-directional effect of trade promotions, pricing, shelf space, and a random store 
variable on quantity supplied and demanded. Finally, the justification for this research is the 
increasing pressure on both retailers and manufacturers to respond to the globalization of supply 
networks. As supply chains become more global, it is important to extend this research to cross-
cultural and international settings in order to examine how differences in culture, currency 
valuations, open/closed market systems, national trade policies, and political environments 
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APPENDIX (A ) CODES USED FOR THIS STUDY 
CODE 1: WINBUGS Code for random store effects of standard deviation 0.5 
 
 Weibull Demand with Advertising Budgets and Random Store Effects  
############################################################################# 
###   This program represents the collaborative efforts of Sirisha Nukala and Ramon Leon. # # 
##This program contains initial values, advertising budgets, demands and stores which are 
randomly distributed# 
############################################################################# 
                                      MODEL     FORMULATION                   
#############################################################################
# Weibull Demand model has a shape parameter that has a Gamma Prior and Advertising 
Budgets that are normal with random store effects which are also normal with a standard 
deviation of 0.5. 
###############        Prior probability values generated                 ############### 
{ 
 
taub ~ dgamma(0.001,0.001)       # Precision parameter for normal random store effects    
sigma <-pow( 1 /  taub,1 / 2)        # Sigma reparameterization 
intercept ~ dnorm(0,0.001)          # Intercept component in the regression model  
beta.advbud ~ dnorm(0,0.001)    # Fixed effects advertising budgets  
r ~ dgamma(1,0.2)                       # Shape parameter for Weibull demand distribution which   
# represents the market size. Inverse scale parameter is used by WINBUGS for Gamma 
#parameterization# 
                                                                                   
############################################################################# 
###############               RANDOM NORMAL STORE EFFECTS                ############### 
 
for(i in 1:N ) {                                                                            # N is the number of Stores (30) 
   b[i] ~ dnorm(0,taub)                                                                # random effect of Stores  
   } 
###############               End of loop                                             ###############  
############################################################################# 
########## This part reads data and calculates Weibull scale parameter   ############# 
 
for(j in 1:M ) {                           # M represents the total data points (300) 
    
log(eta[j]) <- intercept + beta.advbud * log(advbud[j]) + b[Stores[j]]   
# This equation calculates the scale parameter for the Weibull demand distribution in relation to 
#log of advertising budgets 
 
lambda[j] <- pow(eta[j],-r)   
# WINBUGS program recognizes the reparametrized scale parameter in Weibull distribution. 
   }                                                                                             
###############                 End of loop                                              ############### 
############################################################################# 
###   This part consists of likelihood of Demand as exact or censored data point  #######  
for(j in 1:M ) { 
   t[j] ~ dweib(r,lambda[j])I(cen[j],)        
# Actual Demand is the exact values when sales is < inventory censored demand when the  
 169 
#sales > the inventory. Both exact &censored values are distributed as Weibull  
   } 
###############     End of loop                                              ############### 
############################################################################# 
# This part calculates demand quantiles & prediction intervals for all 30 sampled stores # 
 
for(i in 1:N) { 
  
eta23400[i] <- exp(intercept + beta.advbud * log(23400) + b[i])    
# Scale parameter estimate eta values at $23.4k advertising budget for each sampled store# 
    
quan23400[i] <- eta23400[i] * pow((-log(1 - 0.90)),(1/r))        
# 90th percentile at $23400 advertising budget for each sampled store# 
  
lambda23400[i] <- pow(eta23400[i],-r)    
# Reparameterization of Weibull scale parameter for WINBUGS to recognize it. 
  
y.23400[i] ~ dweib(r,lambda23400[i])      
# Predicted sales at $23400 advertising budgets for each of the sampled store 
 
 probability23400[i] <- 1 - exp(-(pow((100000/eta23400[i]),r)))  
# Prob of demand greater than $100000 for each of the sampled stores 
    
eta47000[i] <- exp(intercept + beta.advbud * log(47000) + b[i])    
# Scale parameter estimate eta values at $47Kadvertising budget for each of the sampled stores 
   
quan47000[i] <- (eta47000[i] * pow((-log(1 - 0.99)),(1/r)))         
# 99th percentile at $47K  advertising budget for each of the sampled store 
 
lambda47000[i] <- pow(eta47000[i],-r)   
#Reparameterization of eta into lambda for WINBUGS to recognize the parameter. 
 
y.47000[i] ~ dweib(r,lambda47000[i])  
# Predicted sales for $47000  advertising budget for each of the sampled stores 
 
probability47000[i] <- 1 - exp(-(pow((170000/eta47000[i]),r)))  
# Prob of demand greater than $170000 for each of the sampled stores 
   } 
###############               End of loop                                             ############### 
############################################################################# 
# Estimates & Predictions for a random store from the population of stores nationwide ##  
 
random ~ dnorm(0,taub)               
# Chooses one store at random from population of stores nationwide### 
 
eta23400random <- exp(intercept + beta.advbud * log(23400) + random)  
 # Weibull scale parameter equation in relation with advertising budget & random store effects # 
 
quan23400random <- eta23400random * pow((-log(1 - 0.9)),(1/r))   
# 90th percentile at $23400 advertising budget for a randomly selected store### 
 
lambda23400random <- pow(eta23400random,-r)             
# Reparameterization of the weibull scale parameter for WINBUGS to recognize the value## 
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y.23400random ~ dweib(r,lambda23400random)            
# Predicted sales at $23.4K advertising budget random store selected from population/sample. 
 
probability23400random <- 1 - exp(-(pow((100000/eta23400random),r)))    
# Prob. (demand) > $100K for a random store selected from population of stores nationwide at 
$23.4K advertising budget 
 
 
eta47000random <- exp(intercept + beta.advbud * log(47000) + random)     
 # Estimate of Weibull scale parameter at $47K adv. bud for a random store from the population 
##of stores## 
 
quan47000random <- (eta47000random * pow((-log(1 - 0.99)),(1/r)))     
# Estimating the 99th percentile of demand at  $47K advertising budget for a random store from 
#the population of stores nationwide. 
 
lambda47000random <- pow(eta47000random,-r)           
#Reparameterization of the weibull scale parameter for WINBUGS to recognize# 
 
y.47000random ~ dweib(r,lambda47000random)             
# Predicted sales for a random store at $47K advertising budget## 
 
probability47000random <- 1 - exp(-(pow((170000/eta47000random),r)))       
# Prob(demand) >$170K for a random store at $47K advertising budget### 
 
    } 
###############                End of program model                                  ############### 
############################################################################# 
# DATA GENERATED for random Normal store effects with µ= 0 and σ= 0.5 # 
############################################################################# 
 
list(N = 30, M = 300, 























      



















     





































NA,NA,NA,NA,NA,NA,NA,NA,NA,NA,NA,NA,NA,NA,NA,NA,NA,NA,NA,NA))            
###############             End of data                                            ############### 
############################################################################# 
###############            INITIAL VALUES                                        ###############            
############################################################################# 
list(intercept = 2.5, beta.advbud = 1.2, r = 4.2, taub = 4.5)     # initial values based on simulations 
performed 
list(intercept = 1, beta.advbud = 1,r = 1, taub = 1)  




CODE 2: R-Software Sample Code used for optimization purposes.  
This is for scenario 2 retailer 2 while playing a Cournot Game 
 
optim(c(1,0.7541),sc2r2,sc2r2grad,method="BFGS",hessian=T) 
*The above line of code represents an optimization for scenario 2 for a Cournot game. 
BFGS in the code above refers to Newton Raphsons methods and the initial values 





[1] 0.700195 1.142310 
* The results above represent the optimal retail prices at retailer 2 in scenario 2 while 






function gradient  




* Convergence is equal to zero implies that our simulation has converged which indicates 
that the optimal values are perfect* 
 
$hessian 
           [,1]         [,2] 
[1,] -0.1120951 -0.025325200 
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